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I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this article is to bring together the intellectual rea-
soning behind Title Examination Standards' and the practical aspects of
oil and gas title examination.
A. Reasons for Examination of Title
In the practice of oil and gas law, many situations may arise which
necessitate that an attorney conduct a title examination. The circum-
stances requiring title examination vary. Although this is not purported
to be an exhaustive list, oil and gas titles may be examined for the follow-
ing purposes: (1) the client has acquired oil and gas leases and has a
certain number of days to approve payment of lease bonuses (Lease Ac-
quisition or Original Title Opinion); (2) the client is proposing to drill a
well and is preparing to pool other leasehold owners and unleased min-
eral owners and allocate costs for the well (Drilling Opinion); (3) the
client, as operator, has completed a well and is preparing to disburse
proceeds (Division Order Title Opinion); (4) the client, as first purchaser,
is preparing to disburse proceeds (Division Order Title Opinion); (5) the
client is purchasing producing or non-producing property (Purchase
Opinion); or (6) the bank client is lending money secured by producing
or non-producing property (Mortgagee Title Opinion).
1. Hereafter, the Title Examination Standards will be referred to as "Standards" and a specific
Title Examination Standard will be referred to as "Standard" followed by the section number.
[Vol. 24:547
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B. Distinctions Between Various Opinions
The Standards do not distinguish between the various types of opin-
ions, and it is unnecessary for the title examiner to make such a distinc-
tion. A defect is a defect regardless of the purpose of the opinion.
Therefore, the proper distinction is determining the curative steps neces-
sary to solve a particular problem. However, it may be practical to know
the purpose of the opinion in order for the title examiner's comments and
requirements to be worded accordingly. For example, it is not unusual
to preface a requirement with the words, "For the purpose of this Lease
Acquisition Opinion, you may be willing to rely on an affidavit of death
and heirship." This serves both the practical need of the client and
warns the client that more curative steps may be required at a later time.
The title examiner should feel uncomfortable not mentioning a problem
during the lease acquisition stage of the drilling program knowing that
later, curative steps must be taken before allowing the payment of pro-
ceeds. The purpose of the lease acquisition is the eventual economic real-
ization of the leases taken. Thus the client may not understand why a
requirement not mentioned earlier is made only at the division order title
opinion stage.
1. Lease Acquisition or Original Title Opinion
In the normal sequence of events, the client acquires oil and gas
leases based on an ownership done by a landman or lease broker. Subse-
quently, abstracts are gathered and the client must first be advised
whether to honor the money drafts which have been sent for the payment
of lease bonuses. Normally, the client will ask if there are any "big title
problems" connected with a person's interest. In answering this ques-
tion, it is appropriate to take into consideration the amount of acreage
involved on a particular lease as well as the degree of the problem in-
volved. It is unusual for the landman or lease broker to completely miss
the ownership of a potential lessor, but the possibility should always be
considered. Additionally, the client should be made aware of any en-
cumbrances, liens, or mortgages which affect his lessor's title. This is the
best time to obtain subordinations of mortgages, affidavits of possession,
and tenant disclaimers. It is also a good time to inquire as to the status
of previous oil and gas leases which may have expired in the absence of
production. Although there is usually not time to do judicial determina-
tions of death and heirship, probate proceedings, or quiet title suits, this
1989]
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is a good time to determine whether the facts are such that these pro-
ceedings could be concluded successfully.
2. Drilling Opinion
The lease bonuses have been paid, and the client is now proposing to
drill a well. The client is also preparing to pool other leasehold owners
and unleased mineral owners and to allocate the costs of the well. Nor-
mally, a pooling application list will be taken from the original title opin-
ion. One concern is to advise the client whether all potential owners of
the right to drill are included on his list of pooling applicants. For pur-
poses of precautionary pooling, it is also advisable to include a list of
parties whose interests may be in doubt and unsettled. In addition, the
client should be interested in the mortgagees of various working interest
owners as a consideration for pooling.
It is also important to take into consideration problems involving
the ownership of the surface at the proposed well location including ease-
ments and rights-of-way. The client will also begin providing specific
curative materials for the requirements connected with his own interest
or that of his lessor.
3. Division Order Title Opinion (For Operator
or First Purchaser)
The true nightmare of a title examiner has taken place. The well has
been successfully completed and is producing in paying quantities. Any
mistake made by the title examiner will not be cured by a "dry hole."
The payment of proceeds from the sale of oil and gas production is now
governed by Section 540 of Title 52 of the Oklahoma Statutes. Section
540 imposes time limitations for payment of proceeds and provides for
interest on proceeds that cannot be paid because the title thereto is not
marketable. Furthermore, Section 540 states that the marketability of
title shall be determined in accordance with the then-current title exami-
nation standards of the Oklahoma Bar Association.2
Suddenly, an entirely different standard of title is used. No longer
2. OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 540.A (Supp. 1988). Section 540.A provides:
The proceeds derived from the sale of oil or gas production from any oil or gas well shall be
paid to persons legally entitled thereto, commencing no later than six (6) months after the
date of first sale, and thereafter no later than sixty (60) days after the end of the calendar
month within which subsequent production is sold... Provided, however, that in those
instances where such proceeds cannot be paid because the title thereto is not marketable,
the purchasers of such production shall cause all proceeds due such interest to earn interest
at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum, until such time as the title to such interest has
[Vol. 24:547
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are affidavits and suppositions to be substituted for properly executed
and recorded disclaimers and quit claim deeds. Affidavits of heirship no
longer are substituted for judicial determinations of death and heirship,
or proper probate or administration proceedings. The then-current Title
Examination Standards of the Oklahoma Bar Association will be used as
the guide for the proper determination of title. This statute is the only
place in the Oklahoma Statutes where the Standards are mentioned. Sec-
tion 540 seems to incorporate not only the existing Standards as a bench-
mark of title, but also allows for the criteria of marketability to be
changed by the adoption of future Standards.
This discussion must then closely parallel that of Standard 4.1 (Mar-
ketable Title Defined) in the discourse as to what constitutes marketable
title. However, from a practical standpoint, especially where the opera-
tor is the entity disbursing proceeds of production, many of the same
presumptions made at other stages of title examination are applicable
here. Affidavits of death and heirship are often accepted by the operator
in the place of judicial proceedings. Long possession histories are substi-
tuted by the operator for quiet title decrees. In many cases, indemnifying
language in division orders is substituted for potential title defects. Addi-
tionally, liberal use is made of the Marketable Record Title Act and Sim-
plification of Land Titles Act to determine the marketability of title.
These decisions are matters involving the business judgment of the client.
Other matters are considered for the first time. Mortgages from les-
sors which were subordinated to leases must be reconsidered with regard
to payment of proceeds. Mortgages from leasehold owners must be con-
sidered. Operating agreements, well completion reports, and pooling
elections must be considered in order to make determinations about the
final disbursement of proceeds. Although not required by the statutes or
the Standards, most clients also require executed division orders before
disbursing proceeds.
4. Purchase Opinion
When the client is purchasing producing property, special consider-
ation should be given to the type of purchase which is taking place.
Often there is a large number of leases and/or producing properties
which have different degrees of value to the client. It is advisable to
been perfected. Marketability of title shall be determined in accordance with the then
current title examination standards of the Oklahoma Bar Association.
1989]
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break down the allocation of the purchase price into three or four catego-
ries of properties. While a full examination of title may be important in
one category, it may well be that a less strict examination will be desired
for a different category of property. Proper inquiry may reveal that the
purchase price is justified by the inclusion of only certain properties and
many of the other properties carry little or no allocated weight to the
entire purchase price. The cost of examination of a low priority property
may be more than that property is actually worth. One advantage in the
purchase of producing properties is that there are usually fairly recent
title opinions available which can be examined and updated through ab-
stract examination or tract index examination.
There is another consideration for the purchase opinion. Com-
monly, upon the acceptance of a purchase offer, the purchaser will have a
certain number of days to examine title and notify the seller in writing of
any objections or title defects. Normally the standards to be used are the
then-existing Standards. However, another criteria which can be em-
ployed is what a reasonable and prudent person engaged in the business
of ownership, development, operation, or production of oil and gas
properties, or the purchase of production therefrom would use in order
to disburse revenues in accordance with the title which has been offered.
This may be a more appropriate standard for the purchase of producing
properties. The most important issue for the purchasing client is
whether the seller is receiving revenue. If so, it must be that the title is
acceptable to the current purchaser of production and is probably going
to be acceptable to the purchaser-client. There is even some argument
that a lesser standard can be forced upon a purchaser even when a strict
"marketable title" standard is used in the purchase agreement.
5. Mortgagee Title Opinion
Situations where the bank client has been offered oil and gas prop-
erty (usually leasehold interests) to secure a promissory note ordinarily
fall into two categories, and the scope of examination depends upon the
category.
In the first category, the borrower is purchasing oil and gas leases
(producing) and has asked the bank to finance all or part of the transac-
tion. The title examination will be similar to that of a Purchase Opinion
with consideration being given to the weight of various categories of
property. Examination may involve updating previous title opinions and
determining who is actually receiving revenue. The bank should have its
[Vol. 24:547
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own standards of acceptable title, and should not rely on the standards
which may be acceptable to the purchaser. It is not uncommon for a
conflict to develop between the bank and the borrower, especially where
the borrower has agreed to pay for the expenses of the examination of
title on behalf of the bank. Since the purchase will often involve a dis-
tressed seller, special consideration should be given to mortgages, liens,
and lawsuits which may affect the seller's interest.
In the second category, the borrower is offering additional collateral
to further secure an existing loan which has fallen into arrears. Nor-
mally, the bank prefers not to pay additional expenses of title examina-
tion and will often rely upon the representations of the borrower as to the
amount of monthly revenue from various properties. A bank client
should categorize the property offered, and at least do a limited examina-
tion of the high priority properties. The property is usually offered to the
bank in return for the bank's forebearance of an immediate foreclosure,
and the bank takes the property knowing that an eventual foreclosure is
probably going to be necessary. It is not uncommon to find that the
interest of this borrower is heavily encumbered and may be subject to the
priorities of third parties.
II. AUTHORITATIVENESS OF THE STANDARDS
The discussion below briefly highlights the reasons for the substan-
tial weight given by Oklahoma's real property title attorneys to the Stan-
dards. The development of these Standards is carried out in order to:
(1) facilitate title transfers by resolving issues upon which there may be a
difference of opinion within the Bar3 by adopting the customary position
followed by the vast majority of practicing title attorneys,4 and (2) collect
title curative authority in one place.
After extensive research and discussion, the Title Examination Stan-
dards Committee ("Committee") of the Real Property Section ("Sec-
tion") of the Oklahoma Bar Association ("OBA") revises or develops
new standards which are submitted to the Section at its annual meeting
held at the same time and location as the annual meeting of the OBA.
After the Section and the OBA House of Delegates approve the revised
or new Standards, they are officially published in the Appendix to Chap-
ter 1 of Title 16 (Conveyances) of the Oklahoma Statutes.
3. Promulgation of Standards is necessary when differences of opinion cannot be resolved by a
review of the current law.
4. Customary positions are adopted if they are not contrary to existing law.
1989]
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In order to encourage pre-adoption comment by the members of the
OBA, the proposed revised and new Standards are published in the end-
of-the-month issue of the Oklahoma Bar Journal one to two months
prior to the annual meeting of the OBA. After the annual OBA meeting,
those revised and new Standards that received final approval from both
the Section and the OBA House of Delegates are incorporated into the
existing Standards and published in the Section's Title Examination
Standards Handbook. The Handbook contains all of the Standards in-
cluding recent revisions or additions. It is published annually by the Sec-
tion as soon as possible after the annual OBA meeting. The handbook is
provided free of charge to all Section members and is sold for a nominal
price to others. The Oklahoma Statutes Annotated will include the most
recent Standards in the next revised pocket part. The development, no-
tice, and approval process promotes vigorous analysis, discussion, and
debate on the Standards before adoption so that once they are adopted
the Standards can reasonably be called the official "custom" or "stan-
dard" in Oklahoma.
The Standards are developed and founded on an exhaustive analysis
of existing statutes, case law, major treatises, other states' statutes and
cases, and uniform national "standards." Such authorities are studied,
discussed, and then set out in the "Authority" part of each Standard.
Consequently, a title attorney can begin research on a title question by
reviewing the language of a particular Standard itself, and then reviewing
the cited authority. The Standards can thus act as a mini-brief or mini-
treatise. To the extent that a particular Standard is based directly on the
express wording of existing Oklahoma Statutes or Oklahoma cases, it is
obviously controlling on all parties.
As previously mentioned, the state legislature has clearly expressed
its confidence in the Standards by enacting Section 540, which states that
marketability of title shall be determined in accordance with the then-
current title examination standards of the OBA.5 It should be noted,
however, that the state legislature has expressly provided for such Stan-
dards to apply only to the payment of proceeds. Therefore, it cannot be
presumed that the courts will find that there was legislative intent to au-
tomatically apply the Standards to every surface or other mineral con-
veyance or transaction.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has also expressed its confidence in
the Standards. In Knowles v. Freeman, the court found that although
5. See supra note 2.
[Vol. 24:547
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they were not binding, the standards and the annotations cited in support
were persuasive.6 The persuasiveness of the Standards, according to Jus-
tice Lavender, is based on the careful research and study prior to their
adoption as well as their general acceptance among the members of the
bar.7
The Attorney General's Office stated that "[t]itle examination stan-
dards are not state statutes and, are not promulgated by the Legisla-
ture."8  However, the same opinion also stated that "[t]he title
examination standards are uniform interpretations for the application of
the law that attorneys should use when examining titles."9
The Standards may also apply to a real estate or oil and gas transac-
tion in which the parties agree that the Standards will be used in deter-
mining the acceptability of the title being offered.
Although the Standards are useful and authoritative, there are dan-
gers that can be avoided only by the conscientious efforts of the examin-
ing attorney. The title examiner must be careful to completely review the
body and especially the notes of the Standard. The examiner must also
keep abreast of changes in statutes and cases since the last revisions to a
Standard were made.
III. STANDARDS AND CURATIVE ACTS
Several current Standards and several Oklahoma curative acts are
addressed below. The Standards are treated in numerical order. The
actual language of the particular Standard is given, followed by a discus-
sion of the Standard's background and authority as well as the practical
aspects of applying the particular Standard.
A. Standard 3.3. Affidavits (adopted 1986, no amendments)
While an affidavit recorded after October 31, 1985, which satisfies
the conditions of 16 O.S.A. § 82 is not a substitute for a judicial pro-
ceeding or any other statutory procedure, it does give notice and may
be relied upon for interpretation or clarification purposes in determin-
ing the marketability of title, unless the examiner has reason to suspect
the personal knowledge, competency or veracity of the affiant. 10
6. Knowles v. Freeman, 649 P.2d 532, 535 (Okla. 1982).
7. Id.
8. 11 Op. Att'y Gen. 370 (1979).
9. Id.
10. OxLA. STAT. tit. 16, ch. 1, app. (Supp. 1988). The Comments to Standard 3.3 state:
Comment: In the course of examination of titles, there are frequently matters which
create some doubt in the mind of the title examiner but are not of a nature which would
1989]
9
Morgan and Epperson: Oklahoma Title Examination Standards and Curative Acts Relating t
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1988
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
1. Background
For many years, affidavits setting forth facts about title matters were
filed in the land records without authority allowing their filing or making
filing constructive notice of their contents." In fact, any taking of an
affidavit without specific statutory authority was a crime. 2 However, on
November 1, 1985, Title 16, Sections 82-85 of the Oklahoma Statutes
became effective, providing the authority for filing of record an affidavit
in the local land records. 13 The statute also provides that when an affida-
vit is acknowledged and recorded it serves as notice (i.e., constructive
notice) of the matters covered therein.' 4 However, the affidavit does not
take the place of a judicial proceeding, judgment, decree, or title
standard.' 5
The affidavit may provide information on age, sex, birth, death, rela-
tionship, family history, heirship, names, identities of parties (individual,
corporate, partnership, or trust), identity of officers of corporations,
membership of partnerships, joint ventures or other incorporated as-
sociations, identities of trustees and terms of service, history of organiza-
tion of corporations, partnerships, joint ventures and trusts, marital
status, possession, residence, service in Armed Forces, and conflicts in
recorded instruments.16 The statute further states that the affidavit must
include a legal description of the real property affected,' 7 and that any
person giving a false affidavit would be guilty of perjury and liable for
actual and punitive damages. 8
Since the statute expressly states that an affidavit cannot replace a
require a judicial proceeding to cure the defect. In such cases, affidavits may be relied
upon. For example, where no indication is given in a conveyance of real property as to the
marital status of the grantor, an affidavit that the grantor was not married at the time of
the conveyance should be relied on for purposes of marketability. On the other hand, an
affidavit of heirship cannot take the place of a judicial determination of heirship. Of
course, such an affidavit of heirship would give notice of persons purported to be heirs.
History: The standard as stated above was recommended by the Report of the 1986
Title Examination Standards Committee, 57 O.B.A.J. 2677 (1986). It was approved by the
Real Property Section, November 19, 1986, and adopted by the House of Delegates, No-
vember 20, 1986. For the statement of the standard previously, see 56 O.B.A.J. 2535
(1985).
OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, ch. 1, app. (Supp. 1988).
11. Carter v. Wallace, 193 Okla. 32, 34, 140 P.2d 1018, 1020 (1943); Wilson v. Shasta Oil Co.,
171 Okla. 467, 470, 43 P.2d 769, 772 (1935).
12. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 541 (1981).
13. OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, §§ 82-85 (Supp. 1986) (Marketable Record Title Act).
14. Id. § 82.
15. Id.
16. Id § 83.
17. Id. § 84.
18. Id. § 85.
[Vol. 24:547
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formal proceeding, the impact of the statute is principally: (1) to cloud
title by giving notice of outstanding claims, and (2) to preserve factual
information that some, but not necessarily all, examiners might choose to
rely upon but that is usually lost in the file of an earlier title examiner.
Discussions have arisen on an irregular basis within the Section about
how to give such filed affidavits some weight, perhaps as a presumption,
after being filed of record for a long time, such as ten years. It should be
noted that there is no authority in this statute for the filing of an affidavit
concerning the homestead or non-homestead nature of a tract of real
property.
2. Practicalities
The full impact of Standard 3.3 is not yet known. Even without
statutory authority, abstracts and county records have contained affida-
vits covering the same areas as those mentioned in the statute. These
affidavits are immensely helpful in the work of a title examiner. An affi-
davit of death and heirship can tie together breaks in the chain of title
and explain the proper ownership percentage that might otherwise re-
quire a probate or administration proceeding. Depending on how a title
opinion is being used, one client may be willing to rely upon such an
affidavit for all purposes. Another client may be willing to rely upon an
affidavit of heirship to support the payment of lease bonuses, but may
require judicial proceedings before incurring the expense of drilling a
well or the risk of disbursing proceeds of production.
Only time will tell whether these statutorily approved affidavits will
have more dignity than the ones used previously. However, from a prac-
tical standpoint, an affidavit tells a title examiner part of the overall title
story regardless of how defectively drafted or recorded the document
may be. One practical question the title examiner will have to face in the
future is how to handle affidavits that were not properly executed, ac-
knowledged, and recorded, but still are contained in the county records.
Another question is how much reliance can be placed on the affidavits
since an affidavit is usually self-serving, such as a member of a family
explaining the family history and heirship in lieu of a decree of distribu-
tion, a property owner stating that she is in possession of property, or a
grantor of a deed stating that he was unmarried at the time of execution
of the deed. In particular, an oil and gas title examiner reviews many
unrecorded affidavits of possession. These are usually self-serving state-
ments of possession by the record owner and often contain the apparent
19891
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inconsistency of an out-of-county or out-of-state acknowledgment cou-
pled with a statement that the affiant is in possession of the property.
In summary, Standard 3.3 will not change the way in which a care-
fil title examiner uses affidavits. He or she will explain to the client that
an affidavit is only as good as the person behind the affidavit and would
be hard to defend if the information is in fact not true.
B. Standard 4.L Marketable Title Defined (adopted 1946; last
amended 1966)
All title examinations should be made on the basis of marketabil-
ity as defined by the Supreme Court, to wit:
"A marketable or merchantable title is synonymous with a perfect
title or clear title of record; and is one free from apparent defects, grave
doubts and litigious uncertainty, and consists of both legal and equita-
ble title fairly deducible of record."19
1. Background
Standard 4.1 creates a common basis for examination of title to both
surface and mineral interests. The Standard presents the Oklahoma
Supreme Court's definition of marketable or merchantable title and urges
that, in the absence of any other express agreement between the parties,
all examining attorneys should examine their titles based on this particu-
lar level of quality of title. Further, the Standard emphasizes and affirms
19. OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, ch. 1, app. (Supp. 1988). The Comments to Standard 4.1 state:
Cross References: See Standard 19.1.
Authority: Pearce v. Freeman, 122 Okla. 285, 254 P. 719 (1927); Hausam v. Gray,
129 Okla. 13, 263 P. 109 (1928); Campbell v. Harsh, 31 Okla. 436, 122 P. 127 (1912);
Jennings v. New York Petroleum Royalty Corp., 169 Okla. 528, 43 P.2d 762 (1934); Tull
v. Milligan, 173 Okla. 131, 48 P.2d 835 (1935); Seyfer v. Robinson, 93 Okla. 156, 219 P.
902 (1923); Tucker v. Thaves, 50 Okla. 691, 151 P. 598 (1915); Ammerman v. Karnowski,
109 Okla. 156, 234 P. 774 (1924); Wilson v. Shasta Oil Co., 171 Okla. 467, 43 P.2d 769
(1935); Empire Gas & Fuel Co. v. Stem, 15 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1926); Leedy v. Ellis County
Fair Ass'n, 188 Okla. 348, 110 P.2d 1099 (1941); Hanlon v. McLain, 206 Okla. 227, 242
P.2d 732 (1952); Gordon v. Holman, 207 Okla. 496, 250 P.2d 875 (1952); Hawkins v.
Johnson, 203 Okla. 398, 222 P.2d 511 (1950); Koutsky v. Park Nat'l Bank, 167 Okla. 373,
29 P.2d 962 (1934); Davidson v. Roberson, 92 Okla. 161, 218 P. 878 (1923).
History: Adopted as 11, November 16, 1946, 17 O.B.A.J. 1729 (1946), printed, id. at
1751-1752; became 1 on renumbering in 1948, 19 O.B.A.J. 223 (1948) at which time the
Leedy case was added to the cited authority. On November 30, 1960, the last five cases
cited were added, 1960 Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Oklahoma Bar Associa-
tion at 20. Cross reference added, December 2, 1965. Resolution No. 2, 1965 Real Prop-
erty Committee, 36 O.B.A.J. 2094 (1965), id. at 2182. Approved by Real Property Section
and adopted by House of Delegates, 37 O.B.A.J. 437 (1966).
OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, ch. 1, app. (Supp. 1988).
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the use of this general definition for the terms "marketable" or "mer-
chantable" title whenever either of these terms is expressly used by the
parties.
2. Practicalities
Standard 4.1 defines "marketable title" without discussion as to the
purpose for which the title examiner is examining title. Practically,
"marketable title" may mean different things in oil and gas practice than
in the area of residential real estate or commercial lending. However,
few oil and gas title examiners would feel comfortable explaining to a
client that the title opinion did not include certain comments and re-
quirements that would usually have been made but were omitted because
the oil and gas practice requires a "less perfect title." Most examiners
have come to the conclusion that an examiner should not make a deci-
sion for the client as to the degree of marketability required in an
opinion.
While Standard 4.1 is good as a case citation for many authorities
defining marketable title, it does not affect the day-to-day examination of
title. Once the title has been examined, and all defects and potential de-
fects have been brought to the attention of the client, the Standards may
be helpful in determining what curative steps are required given the pur-
pose of the title opinion. A lessee acquiring leases may require less cer-
tainty of title than the first purchaser who is disbursing proceeds. This
has nothing to do with the marketability of title, but rather with the eco-
nomics and time involved in acquiring leases in competition with other
lessees and with the time constraints in making title considerations.
C. Standard 4.2. Oil and Gas Leases (adopted 1947
last amended 1987)
The recording of a certificate supplied by the Corporation Com-
mission under 17 O.S.A. §§ 167 & 168, reflecting no production and
no exceptions, renders a title marketable as against an unreleased oil
and gas lease or a mineral or royalty conveyance or reservation for a
term of years and as long thereafter as there is production, the primary
term of which has expired prior to the date of the certificate, if the
certificate covers all of the land described in the lease, mineral or roy-
alty conveyance or reservation, as well as any additional land which
may have been spaced or unitized by either the Corporation Commis-
sion or by recorded declaration pursuant to the lease or other recorded
19891
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instrument as of the date of the expiration of the primary term.20
1. Background
The purpose of Standard 4.2 is to identify and encourage the use of a
reliable means for a title examiner to determine whether an oil and gas
lease, a mineral or royalty conveyance, or a reservation of a term of years
that would continue beyond its primary term for as long thereafter as
20. OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, ch. 1, app. (Supp. 1988). The Comments to Standard 4.2 state:
Comment: Said Act originally applied only to oil and gas leases, as did the standard
as originally adopted October 1947. The Act was amended in 1951 so as to cover term
mineral conveyances, as well as oil and gas leases, and the standard was then amended in
November, 1954. By said Act, such certificates constitute prima facie evidence that no
such oil and gas lease or term mineral conveyance is in force, which, if not refuted, will
support a decree for specific performance of a contract to deliver a marketable title. The
facts in Wilson v. Shasta Oil Co., 171 Okla. 467,43 P.2d 769 (1935), disclose that the Court
only held that proof to establish marketability cannot be shown by affidavit of nondevelop-
ment. Beatty v. Baxter, 208 Okla. 686, 258 P.2d 626 (1953), is deemed not to affectprima
facie marketability as provided for in the statute.
Note: This standard does not apply to Osage County, where oil and gas operations
are not under the control and supervision of the Corporation Commission.
Caveat: The Corporation Commission has been known to issue clear certificates of
non-development when, in fact, a well has been drilled and not plugged; therefore, the
cautious attorney will also advise his clients to satisfy themselves there is no well nor pro-
duction upon any of said property and that the lease in not being kept alive by in lieu
royalty payments or production not reported to the Corporation Commission. The exam-
iner should also be aware that the documents evidencing spacing or unitization may either
be unrecorded or only appear in the records of the Corporation Commission.
History: Adopted as G, October 31, 1947, 18 O.B.A.J. 1750, 1751 (1947); became 10
on renumbering, 19 O.B.A.J. 223, 225 (1948), at which time the Note was added. The
standard was amended, November 18, 1954, 1954 Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of
the Oklahoma Bar Association at 91-92 (see also 177) by adding the words, "or a mineral
or royalty conveyance." The form of the motion did not include amendment to the com-
ment. Therefore, only the two sentences beginning, "By said act," and concluding, "an
affidavit of nondevelopment," of the Comment as printed above had been officially adopted
prior to 1962.
The 1962 Real Property Committee recommended that the first two sentences and the
last sentence of the comment as it appears above also be officially adopted, see Recommen-
dation (7), 33 O.B.A.L 2157, 2183 (1962). This recommendation was adopted by the Real
Property Section and the House of Delegates, see id. at 2470.
The 1980 Title Examination Standards Committee of the Real Property Section recom-
mended that the Caveat be added, 51 O.B.A.J. 2726 (1980). The recommendation was
approved by the Real Property Section, December 3, 1980, and adopted by the House of
Delegates, December 5, 1980.
This standard was further amended December 3, 1982. The amendment was proposed
by Report of 1982 Title Examination Standards Committee, 53 O.B.A.J. 2731-32 (1980),
approved by Real Property Section, December 2, 1982, and then adopted by the House of
Delegates.
The report of the 1987 Title Standards Committee recommended amending the body of
the standard and the "Caveat", 58 O.B.A.J. 2839-40 (1987). The Real Property Section
approved the recommendation November 12, 1987, and the House of Delegates adopted it
on November 13, 1987. The amendment added the words "reflecting no production and
no exceptions" to the first sentence of the body of the standard and the words "clear" and
"therefore" to the first sentence of the "Caveat". The amendment added the last sentence
of the "Caveat" also.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, ch. 1, app. (Supp. 1988).
14
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 24 [1988], Iss. 4, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol24/iss4/2
TITLE EXAMINATION
there is production, has in fact expired. The mechanism is the use of a
certification of the fact of non-development of a lease tract by a knowl-
edgeable third party, namely the Corporation Commission. Title 17,
Sections 167 and 168 of the Oklahoma Statutes establish that such certifi-
cate constitutes prima facie evidence of the actual state of production.21
2. Practicalities
Standard 4.2 is more helpful in curing title than in the initial exami-
nation by the title examiner. Usually, not enough information is pro-
vided in the abstract to cover the situations most often encountered. An
examiner is likely to see many old oil and gas leases whose primary terms
have expired in the absence of production. Standard 4.2 can be helpful in
determining whether these leases may create a cloud on title. However,
caution must be used because many times these leases cover large tracts
of lands, requiring the abstracter to include a certificate of non-develop-
ment for all the lands in the leases and any other lands spaced or unitized
with those lands. The abstracter seldom gives enough information for
the use of Standard 4.2 with old leases.
In regard to more current oil and gas leases whose primary terms
have expired in the absence of production, the cautious approach would
be to allow time between the expiration date of the lease and the effective
date of the certificate of non-development. Close attention should be
paid both to lease terms that would permit the lessee to complete the
drilling of a well that was commenced during the primary term and to
other lease terms that may excuse delayed drilling. Subsequent top leases
may be one excuse for delay of drilling on the original lease.
The practical approach is to provide the client a list comprised of all
unreleased oil and gas leases, with complete legal description. It can be a
waste of time to chain old oil and gas leases to determine a list of current
owners when the client intends to use Standard 4.2 and obtain a certifi-
cate of non-development instead of acquiring releases from those current
owners. As a practical matter, once it becomes apparent that there are a
number of old leases that have not been released, or an inordinate
amount of time is being spent on the chaining of their ownership, it may
be wise to make one general requirement covering all of these leases,
specifying the actual descriptions necessary to be covered by certificates
of non-development, cautioning the client that additional lands spaced or
unitized must be included.
21. OKLA. STAT. tit. 17, §§ 167-68 (Supp. 1988).
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There is an important caveat to Standard 4.2. The title examiner
should advise the client that the Oklahoma Corporation Commission
records can be incorrect. Therefore, the client should make inquiry to
acquire assurance that there is no production on the lands, no royalty
payments being made in lieu of production, and that the possession affi-
davits of the lands include existing oil and gas wells.
D. Standard 6.1. Defects in or Omission of Acknowledgments
(adopted 1981, last amended 1988)
With respect to instruments relating to interests in real estate:
A. The validity of such instruments as between the parties
thereto is not dependent upon acknowledgments, 16 O.S.A. § 15.
B. As against subsequent purchasers for value, in the absence of
other notice to such purchasers, such instruments are not valid unless
acknowledged and recorded, except as provided in C and D herein, 16
O.S.A. § 15.
C. Such an instrument containing an acknowledgment which is
defective in form shall be considered valid notwithstanding such de-
fect, and shall not be deemed to impair marketability, provided such
instrument has been recorded for a period of not less than five (5)
years, 16 O.S.A. § 39a.
D. Such an instrument which has not been acknowledged or
which contains an acknowledgment which is defective in some manner
other than in form shall be considered valid notwithstanding such
omission or defect, and shall not be deemed to impair marketability,
provided such instrument has been recorded for a period of not less
than ten (10) years, 16 O.S.A. § 27a. 2
1. Background
Standard 6.1 summarizes existing statutes concerning acknowledg-
ments. Such statutes declare that acknowledgments are not necessary to
the validity of instruments between the parties, and they make instru-
ments with defective or omitted acknowledgments valid for constructive
notice purposes after they have been of record for several years. For-
merly, the curative periods were five years if the form was defective and
ten years if the facts were defective or if the acknowledgment itself was
22. OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, ch. 1, app. (Supp. 1988). The Comments to Standard 6.1 state:
History: Adopted December 4, 1981. Proposed by Report of the 1981 Title Examina-
tion Standards Committee, 52 O.B.A.J. 2723, 2724 (1981). Approved by Real Property
Section and adopted by House of Delegates, 53 O.B.A.J. 257-58 (1982). The Title Exami-
nation Standard which, prior to December 4, 1981, bore the number 6.1 has been renum-
bered 2.3.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, ch. 1, app. (Supp. 1988).
[Vol. 24:547
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omitted in part or in full. As of November 1, 1988, both kinds of defects
are cured after the document is of record for five years.23
It should be noted that at least a few practicing real property attor-
neys have taken the position that absent estoppel or other arguments an
acknowledgment is necessary to the validity of a corporate conveyance as
between the parties. The support for this position is derived from a com-
bination of the language in Sections 15, 92, and 95 of Title 16 of the
Oklahoma Statutes and the Oklahoma Supreme Court case of Bentley v.
Zelma Oil Co. 24 The introductory language of Section 15 states that
"[e]xcept as hereinafter provided, no acknowledgment or recording shall
be necessary to the validity of any deed."' 25  Section 92 provides that
every instrument affecting real estate and acknowledged by a corporation
shall be valid.26 Section 95 requires that every deed executed by a corpo-
ration must be acknowledged by the officer or person signing for the cor-
poration.27 In Bentley v. Zelma Oil Co., the court held that a contract
from a corporation which affected real estate was invalid because it was
not acknowledged in substantial compliance with what is now Section
95.28
2. Practicalities
Standard 6.1 can save the title examiner time and allows title to
23. OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, § 15 (1981); OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, § 27a (1981) amended by OKLA.
STAT. tit 16, § 27a (Supp. 1988); OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, § 39a (1981).
24. 76 Okla. 116, 184 P. 131 (1919).
25. OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, § 15 (1981). Section 15 states:
Except as hereinabove provided, no acknowledgment or recording shall be necessary to the
validity of any deed, mortgage, or contract relating to real estate as between the parties
thereto; but no deed, mortgage, contract, bond, lease or other instrument relating to real
estate other than a lease for a period not exceeding one (1) year and accompanied by actual
possession, shall be valid as against third persons unless acknowledged and recorded as
herein provided.
Id. (emphasis added).
26. OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, § 92 (1981). Section 92 provides:
Every instrument affecting real estate or authorizing the execution of any deed, mortgage or
other instrument relating thereto, executed and acknowledged by a corporation or its attor-
ney-in-fact in substantial compliance with this chapter, shall be valid and binding upon the
grantor, notwithstanding any ommission or irregularity in the proceedings of such corpora-
tion or any of its officers or members, and without reference to any provision in its consti-
tution or bylaws.
Id. (emphasis added).
27. OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, § 95 (1981). Section 95 states:
Every deed, or other instrument affecting real estate, executed by a corporation, must be
acknowledged by the officer or person subscribing the name of the corporation thereto.
Id. (emphasis added).
28. Bentley v. Zelma Oil Co., 76 Okla. 116, 126, 184 P. 131, 141 (1919). See generally A.
DURBIN & C. BIXLER, OKLAHOMA REAL ESTATE FORMS - PRACTIcE (1987).
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improve with the passage of time. From a practical standpoint, defects
that occur that are not covered by the Standards are noted and correc-
tion instruments are requested. The problem of intervening purchasers
must be dealt with on a case-by-case basis, but normally, the practical
approach is to assume that the subsequent purchaser accepts as valid the
otherwise defectively acknowledged instrument.
E. Standard 6.2. Omissions and Inconsistencies in Instruments and
Acknowledgments (adopted 1947, last amended 1961)
Omission of the date of execution from a conveyance or other in-
strument affecting the title does not, in itself, impair marketability.
Even if the date of execution is of peculiar significance, an undated
instrument will be presumed to have been timely executed if the dates
of acknowledgment and recordation, and other circumstances of rec-
ord, support that presumption.
An acknowledgment taken by a notary public in another state
which does not show the expiration of the notary's commission is not
invalid for that reason.
Inconsistencies in recitals or indications of dates, as between dates
of execution, attestation, acknowledgment or recordation, do not, in
themselves, impair marketability. Absent a peculiar significance of one
of the dates, a proper sequence of formalities will be presumed
notwithstanding such inconsistencies.29
29. OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, ch. 1, app. (Supp. 1988). The Comments to Standard 6.2 state:
Authority: R. & C. Patton, Titles §§ 350, 353, 359 & 364 (2d ed. 1957); P. Basye,
Clearing Land Titles §§ 233-236 & 247-249 (1953); 26 CJ.S., Deeds §§ 22a. & f., & 53a;
May v. Archer, 302 P.2d 768 (Okla. 1956); Maynard v. Hustead, 185 Okla. 20, 90 P.2d 30
(1939); Scott v. Scott, 111 Okla. 96, 238 P. 468 (1925).
Vol. 1 C.J.S. Acknowledgments § 876; Annot., 29 A.L.R. 980 (1928); Kansas City &
S.E. Ry. Co. v. Kansas City & S.W. Ry. Co., 129 Mo. 62, 31 S.W. 451 (1895); Sheridan
County v. McKinney, 79 Neb. 220, 112 N.W. 329 (1907); (See also acknowledgment cura-
tive statutes).
Comment: An indication of the date of execution is not essential for any purpose. It
is a recital, like other recitals; important, if the date is in issue; helpful, in any case; pre-
sumptively correct, but subject to rebuttal or explanation. The same is true of the date of
attestation and, generally, of acknowledgment. The only crucial date, that of delivery, is
not normally found in the instrument. Hence, omission of the date from one of an ordi-
nary series of conveyances may be disregarded. Even though a special importance attaches
to the date of execution, as in the case of a power of attorney, a presumption of timely
execution (e.g., in proper sequence in relation to other instruments) should be indulged if
supported by other dates and circumstances of record.
As recitals of dates may be omitted or explained, are notoriously inaccurate and are
more generally in error than are the actual sequences of formalities, inconsistencies in the
indicated dates of formalities (e.g., acknowledgment dated prior to execution; execution
dated subsequent to indicated date of recordation) should be disregarded. Further, the
inconsistency or impossibility of a recited date should not be regarded as vitiating the par-
ticular formality involved. An act curative of the formality will eliminate any question as
to its date. If, however, under the circumstances indicated by the record, a peculiar signifi-
cance attaches to any of the dates (e.g., priorities; important presumption), inconsistency or
impossibility should not be disregarded.
[Vol. 24:547
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In the absence of an expressed delay set out on the face of the docu-
ment, the date of delivery of a conveyance to the grantee is the effective
date of the instrument. As stated in May v. Archer, "a deed, in the ab-
sence of a contrary statutory position, takes effect from the date of its
delivery, not from the time of its record or date, or signing and acknowl-
edgement.""0 Therefore, errors in other dates recited on the face of an
instrument, such as the execution or acknowledgment, usually have no
effect on the marketability of the title.
2. Practicalities
Standard 6.2 provides comfort to the examiner so that he does not
get too excited over the sequence of events where it appears an instru-
ment was dated after it was acknowledged. It is not uncommon for a
date to have been omitted either on the instrument or the acknowledg-
ment. Standard 6.2 states that even if the date of execution is of peculiar
significance, an undated instrument will be presumed to have been timely
executed if the date of acknowledgment and recordation support that
presumption.
The third paragraph of the Standard involves inconsistencies in the
recitals on instruments. Absent a peculiar significance of one of the
dates, a proper sequence of formalities will be presumed notwithstanding
such inconsistencies.
The comments following the Standard are helpful in putting the
"date" issue in proper perspective. The-date of execution is seen as a
recital and presumptively correct, subject to rebuttal or correction. The
same is true of the attestation and the acknowledgment. The only crucial
date is the date of delivery, which is never shown on the instrument.
F. Standard 7.1. Marital Interests: Definition, Applicability of
Standards; Bar or Presumption of Their Non-Existence
(adopted 1947 last amended 1984)
The term "Marital Interest," as used in this chapter, means the
rights and restrictions placed by law upon an individual landowner's
History: Second paragraph of standard and second paragraph of citations adopted as
B, October 31, 1947, 18 O.B.A.J. 1750 (1947); became 6 on renumbering, 19 O.B.A.J. 223,
224 (1948); enlarged and adopted as 6.2, December 2, 1961, 32 O.B.A.J. 2280 (1961);
printed, id. at 1866-67, 1921-22, 1970-71 & 2030-31; see also id. at 1425-26.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, ch. 1, app. (Supp. 1988).
30. May v. Archer, 302 P.2d 768, 771 (Okla. 1956) (quoting 26 C.J.S. Deeds § 53(a)).
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ability to convey or encumber the homestead and the protections af-
forded to the landowner's spouse therein.
Severed minerals cannot be impressed with homestead character
and therefore, the standards contained in this chapter are inapplicable
to instruments relating solely to previously severed mineral interests.
Marketability of title is not impaired by the possibility of an out-
standing marital interest in the spouse of any former owner whose title
has passed by instrument or instruments which have been of record in
the office of the county clerk of the county in which the property is
located for not less than ten (10) years after the date of recording,
where no legal action shall have been instituted during said ten (10)
year period in any court of record having jurisdiction, seeking to can-
cel, avoid or invalidate such instrument or instruments on the ground
or grounds that the property constituted the homestead of the party or
parties involved.3 1
The Oklahoma Constitution32 and Section 4 of Title 16 of the
Oklahoma Statutes3 3 protect family homestead by restricting the record
31. OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, ch. 1, app. (Supp. 1988). The Comments to Standard 7.1 state:
Authority: 16 O.S.A. § 4.
Comment: See Title Examination Standard 21.1 as to use of powers of attorney.
History: Adopted as A., October 31, 1947, 18 O.B.A.J. 1750 (1947); became 7 on
renumbering in 1948, 19 O.B.A.J. 224 (1948). An amended standard, proposed by the
1970 Real Property Committee's Supplemental Report as Exhibit A, 41 O.B.A.J. 2676
(1970) was approved by the Real Property Section on December 3, 1970, and adopted by
the House of Delegates on December 4, 1970, 42 O.B.A.J. 706 (1971). It substantially
modifies the previous standard of the same number. The Comment was added on the
recommendation of the 1983 Title Examination Standards Committee, see Committee Re-
port, 54 O.B.J. 2379 (1983), approved by the Real Property Section, November 3, 1983,
and adopted by the House of Delegates, November 4, 1983.
The first two paragraphs were proposed as additions by the Report of the Title Exami-
nation Standards Committee, 55 O.B.A.J. 1871 (1984) and were approved by the Real
Property Section, November 1, 1984, and adopted by the House of Delegates, November 2,
1984.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, ch. 1, app. (Supp. 1988).
32. OKLA. CONST. art. XII, § 2. Section 2 provides:
The homestead of the family shall be, and is hereby protected from forced sale for the
payments of debts, except for the purchase money therefor or a part of such purchase
money, the taxes due thereon, or for work and material used in constructing improvements
thereon; nor shall the owner, if married, sell the homestead without the consent of his or her
spouse, given in such manner as may be prescribed by law; Provided, Nothing in this article
shall prohibit any person from mortgaging his homestead, the spouse, if any, joining therein;
nor prevent the sale thereof on foreclosure to satisfy any such mortgage.
Id. (emphasis added).
33. Okla. Stat. tit. 16, § 4 (Supp. 1986). Section 4 states:
No deed, mortgage, or conveyance of real estate or any interest in real estate, other than a
lease for a period not to exceed one (1) year, shall be valid unless in writing and subscribed
by the grantors. No deed, mortgage, or contract affecting the homestead exempt by law,
except a lease for a period not exceeding one (1) year, shall be valid unless in writing and
subscribed by both husband and wife, if both are living and not divorced, or legally sepa-
rated, except as otherwise provided for bylaw. Nonjoinder of the spouse shall not invalidate
the purchase of a home with mortgage loan insurance furnished by the Veteran's Adminis-
tration or written contracts and real estate mortgages executed by the spouse of a person
[Vol. 24:547
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owner's right to convey said homestead. During the first ten years that
an instrument is recorded, close attention is given to potential homestead
restrictions; after ten years, the problem completely disappears if no legal
action has been instituted seeking to cancel, avoid, or invalidate the con-
veyance. Any instrument which has been recorded less than ten years
should be examined closely for the consideration of the marital interest.
If a grantor, mortgagor, or lessor owns a surface interest in the tract
of land being conveyed, mortgaged, or leased, the marital status should
be noted and the instrument should be executed by the spouse if married.
This is true even if the instrument being executed is an oil and gas lease, a
mineral deed, or another kind of instrument not directly affecting the
surface.
G. Standard 72. Marital Interests and Marketable Title (adopted
1983; last amended 1986)
Except as otherwise provided in Standard 7.1, no deed, mortgage
or other conveyance by an individual grantor shall be approved as suf-
ficient to vest marketable title in the grantee unless:
A. The body of the instrument contains the grantor's recitation
to the effect that the individual grantor is unmarried;
or
B. An affidavit made and recorded pursuant to 16 O.S.A. § 82
recites that the individual grantor was unmarried at the date of such
conveyance;
or
C. The individual grantor's spouse, identified as such in the
body of the instrument, subscribes the instrument as a grantor;
or
D. The grantee is the spouse of the individual grantor and the
fact is recited by the grantor in the body of the instrument.34
who is certified by the United States Department of Defense to be a prisoner of war or
missing in action. A deed affecting the homestead shall be valid without the signature of the
spouse of the grantor, and the spouse shall be deemed to have consented thereto, when said
deed has been recorded in the offlce of the county clerk of the county in which the real estate
is located for a period often (10) years prior to a date six (6) months after May 25, 1953, and
thereafter when the same shall have been so recorded for a period often (10) years, and no
action shall have been instituted within said time in any court of record having jurisdiction
seeking to cancel, avoid, or invalidate such deed by reason of the alleged homestead charac-
ter of the real estate at the time of such conveyance.
Id. (emphasis added).
34. OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, ch. 1, app. (Supp. 1988). The Comments to Standard 7.2 state:
Comment: There is no question that an instrument relating to the homestead is void
unless subscribed by both husband and wife. The word "void" should be emphasized.
Grenard v. McMahan, 441 P.2d 950 (Okla. 1968). It is also settled that husband and wife
must execute the same instrument, separately executed separate instruments being both
void, Thomas v. James, 84 Okla. 91, 202 P. 499 (1921). Joinder by husband and wife must
19891
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1. Background
The Oklahoma Constitution and Statutes35 clearly prohibit the mar-
ital homestead from being conveyed without the joinder of both spouses
on the same instrument. In fact, a conveyance without such joinder is
void according to case law in Oklahoma. 6
Since the homestead nature of a tract of land cannot be determined
by any recordable means other than a lawsuit, it is necessary to have a
recital of marital status and joinder of spouse accompanying every con-
veyance, except for a conveyance of previously severed minerals. There-
fore, from a title examination standpoint, the authority granted under
Title 16, Section 13 of the Oklahoma Statutes, which allows a spouse to
be required in all cases due to the impossiblity of ascertaining from the record whether the
property was or was not homestead or whether the transaction is one of those specifically
permitted by statute, see 16 O.S.A. §§ 4, 6, 7 and Okla. Const. art. XII § 2. It is essential
that the distinction between a valid conveyance and a conveyance vesting marketable title
be made when consulting this standard. See Title Examination Standard 4.1.
Another rather settled point is that one may not rely upon recitations, either in the
instrument or in a separate affidavit, to the effect that the property was not in fact home-
stead. Such a recitation by the grantor may be strong evidence when the issue is litigated,
but cannot be relied upon for the purpose of establishing marketability, Hensley v. Fletcher,
172 Okla. 19, 44 P.2d 63 (1935).
Although the distinction may seem tenuous, the examiner may rely upon the grantor's
recitation to the effect that he is unmarried. This may have its foundation in Payne v.
Allen, 178 Okla. 328, 62 P.2d 1227 (1936), wherein the Court in its syllabus said, "the
recitation... is conclusive... in the absence ofproof to the contrary." (Emphasis supplied.)
Perhaps the recitation of one's marital status is a recital of that person's identity, see Title
Examination Standard 5.3. Or perhaps this recitation must be relied upon due to the lack
of any alternative.
Caveat: The recitation may not be relied upon if, upon "proper inquiry," the purchaser
could have determined otherwise, Keel v. Jones, 413 P.2d 549 (Okla. 1966).
It is not clear whether or not the spouse of the individual owner/grantor must be
named in the granting clause as a grantor. Until the matter is clarified, the title examiner
must so require. The case of Melson v. Sneed, 188 Okla. 388, 109 P.2d 509 (1940), so
"assumed" but specifically did not so "decide".
Definitions of the word "subscribe" may be found in various sources, but the cases
seem to uphold or invalidate instruments because husband and wife did or did not "sign"
or "join", without distinguishing between the two words or reconciling them with the word
"subscribe". See Atkinson v. Barr, 428 P.2d 316 (Okla. 1967); Grenard v. McMahan, 441
P.2d 950 (Okla. 1968).
One may convey to his spouse without the grantee/spouse's joinder as a grantor, but
prudence would dictate that the grantor/spouse identify himself in the body of the deed as
the spouse of the grantee/spouse. This would appear to be a reliable recital and compara-
ble with a recital by a grantor that he is unmarried. See Brooks v. Butler, 184 Okla. 414, 87
P.2d 1092 (1939) and Title Examination Standard 5.3.
History: Adopted, November 4, 1983, by House of Delegates on recommendation of
the 1983 Committee on Title Examination Standards, 54 O.B.A.J. 2379-80 (1983), and
approval of the Real Property Section, November 3, 1983. Section B added to the standard
by recommendation in the Report of the 1986 Title Examination Standards Committee, 57
O.B.A.J. 2677-78 (1986), approval of the Real Property Section, November 20, 1986, and
adoption by the House of Delegates, November 21, 1986. See "Comment" to Standard 3.3.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, ch. 1, app. (Supp. 1988).
35. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
36. Grenard v. McMahan, 441 P.2d 950 (Okla. 1968).
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convey real estate, other than homestead, belonging to him or her with-
out joinder of the other spouse in the conveyance is rendered useless.3 7
The provisions of Title 16, Sections 6 and 7 of the Oklahoma Stat-
utes, which allow conveyance of the homestead by one of the spouses if
abandoned for a year or if the non-joining spouse is incapacitated, are
similarly useless in the absence of a properly recorded court order.38
However, there are three instances where the title examiner may en-
counter a conveyance without a joinder by both spouses: (1) the grantor
is not married (i.e., single, divorced, or widowed); (2) the grantor failed
to have the spouse join and the land was not homestead property when
conveyed; and (3) the grantee is the "non-joining" spouse. If the grantor
is not married, then obviously no spouse can join in the conveyance.
While a recital in the conveyance by the grantor that the land is not
"homestead" cannot be relied on for marketability purposes,39 it is gener-
ally accepted that there is no alternative to relying on a recital of the
grantor that he or she is unmarried. However, any person other than a
subsequent innocent purchaser who fails to make reasonable inquiry is
charged with notice of a non-joining spouse's claim.4' If the grantor sim-
ply failed to have the other spouse join in the conveyance, a corrective
instrument must be executed by both spouses and filed of record. If the
grantee is the non-joining spouse, it is self-evident that it would be redun-
dant for the non-joining spouse to join in a conveyance to himself or
herself.
Many spouses may not desire to be responsible for a general or lim-
ited warranty or other representations made in a conveyance if the title
to a parcel of land is owned solely by their spouse. Therefore, it might be
appropriate for the language of the conveyance to limit the non-title
holder's participation in a conveyance so that it is without representation
or warranty but simply conveys their "homestead interest, if any."
2. Practicalities
If there is a defect in this execution, it should be emphasized to the
client that a correction deed or ratification of the prior instrument itself
37. OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, § 13 (1981). Section 13 states:
The husband or wife may convey, mortgage or make any contract relating to any real
estate, other than the homestead, belonging to him or her, as the case may be, without
being joined by the other in such conveyance, mortgage or contract.
Id.
38. OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, §§ 6 (1981), 7 (Supp. 1988).
39. Hensley v. Fletcher, 172 Okla. 19, 21, 44 P.2d 63, 65 (1935).
40. Keel v. Jones, 413 P.2d 549, 552 (Okla. 1966).
19891
23
Morgan and Epperson: Oklahoma Title Examination Standards and Curative Acts Relating t
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1988
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
will be void unless the husband and wife execute the same instrument to
correct the defective instrument.
Types of conveyances which are acceptable include the following:
(a) a conveyance executed by husband and wife with a recitation that
they are husband and wife; (b) a conveyance executed by John Doe with
a recitation that John Doe is single or unmarried; (c) a conveyance exe-
cuted by John Doe without recitation, followed by an affidavit properly
executed and recorded reciting that the individual grantor was unmar-
ried at the date of such conveyance; and (d) a conveyance where the
grantee is the spouse of the individual grantor and that fact is recited by
the grantor in the body of the instrument.
Particular situations which are not acceptable include the following:
(a) a conveyance from "Mary Smith, dealing in her sole and separate
property"; (b) a conveyance from "John Doe, a married man"; (c) a con-
veyance from "John Doe, a married man, dealing in his sole and separate
property"; (d) a conveyance from "John Doe," with further recitation
that the property is not the homestead of the grantor; and (e) a convey-
ance from "John Doe and Mary Doe," but it is not recited that they are
husband and wife.
The situation that causes the most trouble for title examiners is
when the grantor was aware of the possible homestead restriction and
has included words on the instrument that the property "is not the
homestead property" or "is the grantor's sole and separate property."
The requirement that the joinder of the spouse is necessary is usually not
believed. However, the comment to Standard 7.2 makes it clear that
while such a recitation may be strong evidence when the issue is litigated,
it cannot be relied upon for the purpose of establishing marketability.
As a practical matter, attention should be given to the caveat re-
garding the grantor's recitation that he is unmarried. The caveat states:
the recitation may not be relied upon if, upon "proper inquiry," the pur-
chaser could have determined otherwise.41 If this caveat is cautioning
the title examiner to do a "due diligence" inquiry to determine if the
grantor is in fact unmarried, subparagraphs A and B of Standard 7.2 will
lose their effectiveness. More likely, it means that if the abstract itself
includes evidence that the grantor was in fact married on the date of
conveyance, or the logical inference from other instruments was that the
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H. Standard 81. Termination of Joint Tenancies and Life Estates
(adopted 1981, last amended 1988)
In the event of the death of a life tenant or joint tenant, the death
is a fact which must have been established by one of the following
methods and such showing in the abstract shall satisfy the rule on
marketability.
A. NON-JUDICIAL TERMINATION OF JOINT TEN-
ANCY ESTATES.
Where a joint tenancy estate in real property was held only by a
husband and wife, the death of one of the joint tenants and the termi-
nation of the joint tenancy thereby may have been evidenced, to the
extent permitted by statute from time to time from and after August
16, 1974, by the filing, in the office of the county clerk in the county in
which the joint tenancy property is located, of an affidavit meeting the
requirements of 58 O.S.A. § 912 in effect at the date of such filing.
Prior to November 1, 1988, such affidavit must have been exe-
cuted by the surviving joint tenant; on or after November 1, 1988, such
affidavit must have been executed by either the surviving joint tenant
or the personal representative of such surviving joint tenant.
1. Affidavit filed prior to November 1, 1983. In the case of an
affidavit filed prior to November 1, 1983, only a single tract of real
property, any portion of which was held as homestead by husband and
wife as joint tenants, could be the subject of the affidavit and the fol-
lowing must have been filed with the affidavit:
a. A certified copy of the certificate of death of the joint tenant
issued by the State Department of Public Health of Oklahoma or the
comparable agency of the place of the death of said joint tenant;
and
b. Either:
i. Prior to October 1, 1975. Certification by the County Treas-
urer of the county wherein the property is located that all or a portion
of the tract described was claimed as homestead by the affiant and the
decedent in the year of decedent's death, and describing such real
property and a complete list of all real property owned by decedent; or
ii. On or after October 1, 1975. Certification by the county as-
sessor of the county wherein the property is located, that all or part of
the tract described was allowed as homestead to the affiant and the
decedent in the year of decedent's death; and
c. Either:
i. Prior to October 1, 1980. In the case of an affidavit fied
before October 1, 1980, a waiver or release of the state estate tax lien,
unless made unnecessary by the ten (10) year statute of limitations; or
ii. On or after October 1, 1980. In the case of an affidavit fied
on or after October 1, 1980, if such property was included in an estate
where taxes were due under the provisions of 68 O.S.A. § 804, a waiver
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or release of the estate tax lien by the Oklahoma Tax Commission as to
such deceased person and property unless made unnecessary by the ten
(10) year statute of limitations; provided that, if no such taxes were
due, then neither was required and the affidavit must so state, pursuant
to 1980 Okla. Sess. Laws, ch. 286, § 2 and 68 O.S.A. § 815(d) effective
October 1, 1980.
2. Affidavit filed on or after November 1, 1983, and prior to No-
vember 1, 1984. In the case of an affidavit filed on or after November
1, 1983, and prior to November 1, 1984, any real property which was
held by husband and wife as joint tenants could be the subject of the
affidavit and the following must have been filed with the affidavit:
a. A certified copy of the certificate of death of the joint tenant
issued by the State Department of Health of Oklahoma or the compa-
rable agency of the place of the death of said joint tenant; and,
b. If such property was included in an estate where taxes were
due under the provisions of 68 O.S.A. § 804, a waiver or release of the
estate tax lien by the Oklahoma Tax Commission as to such deceased
person and property unless made unnecessary by the ten (10) year stat-
ute of limitations; provided that, if such taxes were not due, the affida-
vit shall so state, pursuant to 1983 Okla. Sess. Laws, ch. 20 § 1,
effective November 1, 1983 and 68 O.S.A. § 815(d).
3. Affidavit fied on or after November 1, 1984. In the case of an
affidavit filed on or after November 1, 1984, any real property which
was held by husband and wife as joint tenants could be the subject of
the affidavit and the following must have been filed with the affidavit:
a. Either:
i. For an Affidavit filed prior to November 1, 1986. A certified
copy of the certificate of death of the deceased joint tenant issued by
the State Department of Health or the comparable agency of the place
of death of said joint tenant; or
ii. For an Affidavit filed on or after November 1, 1986. A certi-
fied copy of the certificate of death of the joint tenant issued by the
State Department of Public Health of Oklahoma or a court clerk as
prescribed in 63 O.S.A. § 1-307 or the comparable agency of the place
of the death of said joint tenant. 58 O.S.A. § 912(1) as amended, effec-
tive November 1, 1986: and
b. Either:
i. Where death occured prior to November 1, 1984. A waiver or
release by the Oklahoma Tax Commission of the estate tax lien must
be fied with an affidavit which isfiled on or after November 1, 1984,
with respect to a joint tenant who died prior to November 1, 1984,
unless such waiver or release is made unnecessary by the ten (10) year
statute of limitations, 58 O.S.A. § 912 & 68 O.S.A. § 811(d), both as
amended, effective November 1, 1984; or
ii. Where death occured on or after November 1, 1984. No tax
[Vol. 24:547
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clearance documentation is required, and no recitation regarding estate
tax liability need be contained in the affidavit.
Title 58 O.S.A. § 912 is a procedural statute, and an affidavit filed
pursuant thereto may be relied upon as evidence of the death of a joint
tenant irrespective of the date of death if such statute is otherwise ap-
plicable, even though the death may have occured prior to the effective
date of 58 O.S.A. § 912; provided that the merchantability of the title
of the surviving spouse may be impaired by the estate tax lien under
the circumstances noted in paragraph 3. b. i. above, unless a waiver or
release has been filed, if necessary.
B. JUDICIAL TERMINATION OF JOINT TENANCY ES-
TATES AND LIFE ESTATES.
In all other instances, the death is a fact which must be judicially
determined by any of the following proceedings:
1. By proceeding in the district court as provided in 58 O.S.A.
§ 911; or
2. In connection with an action brought in any court of record,
where the court makes a valid judicial finding of death of the person
having the interest as a life tenant or a joint tenant; or
3. With respect only to joint tenancy estates, if the estate of the
decedent was probated on other property, by showing the letters testa-
mentary or of administration, 60 O.S.A. § 74.
A waiver or release of the estate tax lien as to such joint tenant or
life tenant must be obtained with any of said proceedings, unless the
district court in which the estate of the decedent was probated enters
an order pursuant to 58 O.S.A. § 282.1, effective October 1, 1980, ad-
judicating that there is no estate tax liability, or unless made unneces-
sary by the ten (10) year statute of limitations or by 68 O.S.A.
§ 811(d), effective November 1, 1984.42
1. Background
At the death of a joint tenant or life tenant, there is not a transfer of
title to the survivors or remaindermen. Instead, there is an instantaneous
extinguishment of any claim of interest by the deceased or their estate
42. OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, ch. 1, app. (Supp. 1988). The Comments to Standard 8.1:
Comment: 68 O.S.A. § 811(d) was amended effective November 1, 1984. The perti-
nent amendment provides that no estate tax lien shall attach to any property passing to a
surviving spouse, either through the estate of the deceased or by joint tenancy. The text of
the statute does not clearly make it retroactive to deaths occuring prior to November 1,
1984, and should not be considered to be retroactive at this time. For this reason, it is
necestary to obtain estate tax clearances where the deceased joint tenant died prior to
November 1, 1984, even though 58 O.S.A. § 912 as amended effective November 1, 1984,
makes no such requirement. Such statute may be utilized on or after November 1, 1984,
together with the appropriate tax clearances, to terminate a joint tenancy where the de-
ceased joint tenant died prior to November 1, 1984.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, ch. 1, app. (Supp. 1988).
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against the subject interest. If title to the land is held in joint tenancy, or
as a life estate, the fact that a joint tenant or life tenant has died can be
determined by a court.43
In an effort to speed up the determination of death of a joint tenant
and to reduce the related expenses, an affidavit process has been estab-
lished by the state legislature. Under this system, an affidavit from the
surviving joint tenant which includes a legal description of the interest is
filed of record in the local land records. The affidavit process is not ap-
plicable to life tenants.
Since the inception of the system, the allowable uses of affidavits has
expanded. Originally affidavits were used only when joint tenants were
husband and wife and the one tract of property involved was the home-
stead. Currently affidavits can cover multiple tracts of homestead and
non-homestead property as long as title was held by husband and wife.
The format of Standard 8.1 helps distinguish which requirements
must be met over the years. By statute, the affidavit is required to have
certain informational documents attached before it constitutes satisfac-
tory evidence of a joint tenant's death. The required attachments have
always included a certified copy of the death certificate. For a certain
period of time, a certification of the homestead nature of the property by
the local county treasurer was required. Additionally, in the past a
waiver of estate tax, release of estate tax, or a self-serving recital of no
estate tax being due was necessary. However, for deaths occurring on or
after November 1, 1984, no estate tax can arise on joint tenancy property
and, therefore, no documentation or self-serving recital concerning estate
tax liability is needed.
The use of self-serving affidavits to render title marketable is a con-
cept which made several members of the Title Examination Standards
Committee of the OBA ("Standards Committee") uncomfortable. How-
ever, Standard 8.1 was approved in reliance on the express language of
Title 58, Section 912 of the Oklahoma Statutes, which provides: "The
filing of such documents shall constitute conclusive evidence of the death
of such joint tenant and the termination of said joint tenancy. The title
of such real estate shall be deemed merchantable unless otherwise
defective."'
The question has arisen whether anyone other than the surviving
joint tenant can sign the subject affidavit. While there is not any case law
43. OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, § 911 (1981).
44. OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, § 912 (Supp. 1988).
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in Oklahoma on point, until November 1, 1988, the Standards Commit-
tee unofficially suggested that the statute should be interpreted literally
with the result that an attorney-in-fact and a personal representative of
the "surviving" joint tenant could not exercise this right. However, as of
November 1, 1988, authority for allowing the "surviving" joint tenant's
personal representative to sign the subject affidavit is expressly granted
by Title 58, Section 912 of the Oklahoma Statutes.
2. Practicalities
Careful attention should be given to the different procedures which
apply to non-judicial termination of a joint tenancy. Although it is be-
coming more common, most abstracts do not include the items covered
by Standard 8.1. Generally, there are two questions which occur in con-
nection with the termination of a joint tenancy or life estate, namely:
(1) Is the person dead? and (2) Is a tax release necessary? Standard 8.1
covers both of these questions. The oil and gas client will usually be
willing to accept much less than is required in the title opinion. This is
particularly true at the early stages of the leasing and drilling program
where almost any evidence of the death of a joint tenant or life tenant
will be relied upon for the payment of lease bonuses and/or the alloca-
tion of expenses for the drilling of a well.
I. Standard 9.2. Execution Defects (adopted 1957 last amended
1988)
Any corporation deed, mortgage or other instrument affecting
real property which has been on record in the county clerk's office for
five (5) years or more and which is defective because of: (1) the failure
of the proper corporate officer to sign; (2) the absence of the corporate
seal; (3) the lack of an acknowledgment; or (4) any defect in the execu-
tion, acknowledgment, recording or certificate of recording, should be
accepted without requirement. 16 O.S.A. § 27a.
Such instruments recorded less than five (5) years must have the
name of the corporation subscribed thereto either by an Attorney in
Fact, or by the President or any Vice-President, and, unless executed
by an Attorney in Fact, must be atteted by the Secretary, an Assistant
Secretary or a Clerk of such corporation, or by the Secretary, an Assis-
tant Secretary, Clerk, Cashier or Assistant Cashier in case of a bank,
with the corporate seal attached. 16 O.S.A. §§ 91-94, 6 O.S.A.
§ 414(F), 6 O.S.A. § 104 and 12 U.S.C.A. § 24 (5) & (6).
The Power of Attorney authorizing an Attorney in Fact to act on
behalf of a corporation must be executed and attested in the same man-
ner as a deed or other conveyance, and must be filed in the office of the
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County Clerk before the executed instrument becomes effective; pro-
vided, however, that any Power of Attorney promulgated by an agency
of the Government of the United States shall be deemed sufficiently
recorded for purposes of this standard if the promulgation thereof shall
be published in the Federal Registry of the Government of the United
States and any instrument executed pursuant to said Power of Attor-
ney recites the specific reference to said publication. 16 O.S.A. § 20.
A showing of the authority of the board of Directors to execute such
instrument is not necessary. 18 O.S.A. §§ 1015, 1016(4) & 1018.
Every Oklahoma corporation has authority to acquire, encumber
and sell property subject only to the limitations in Okla. Const. art.
XXII, § 2 and 18 O.S.A. § 1020. See 18 O.S.A. § 1016(4).
Any corporation, foreign or domestic, which has conveyed real
property by instrument signed, acknowledged, attested and sealed as
required in 16 O.S.A. §§ 93-95, and which has received the considera-
tion therefor, cannot assert as a defense its lack of authority to sell said
property. 18 O.S.A. § 1018, 16 O.S.A. § 92 and 16 O.S.A. § 11.
An instrument executed by a corporation with its seal attached
prior to November 1, 1986, is prima facie evidence that such instru-
ment was the act of the corporation, that it was executed and signed by
persons who were its officers or agents acting by authority of the board
of directors and that the seal is the corporate seal and was affixed by
authorized persons. 1947 Okla. Sess. Laws, p. 185, § 242. A corporate
instrument executed, attested, sealed and acknowledged in proper
form on or after November 1, 1986, should be presumed, in the ab-
sence of actual or constructive knowledge to the contrary, to have been
duly authorized, signed by authorized officers and affixed with the gen-
uine seal by proper authority, 18 O.S.A. § 1018, R. & C. Patton, Titles§§ 403-404 (2d ed. 1957) and Flick, Abstract and Title Practice § 1292
(2nd ed. 1958).
Such evidence becomes conclusive after five (5) years, 16 O.S.A.§ 27a.
A dissolved domestic corporation continues to exist for three (3)
years (or a longer period if directed by a district court) for the purpose
of winding up its affairs, 18 O.S.A. § 1099.45
45. OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, ch. 1, app. (Supp. 1988). The Comments to Standard 9.2 state:
Comment: It is immaterial from an examiner's standpoint that the corporation ac-
quired real estate by an ultra vires act; R. & C. Patton, Titles § 401 (2d ed. 1957).
Comment: The Legislature's repeal in 1986 of 1947 Okla. Sess. Laws, p. 186, § 242 as
a part of the complete revision of Title 18 does not appear to have been intended to require
thereafter proof of record of corporate and officer authority, etc.
Comment: See Title Examination Standard 6.5 as to documents executed outside the
State of Oklahoma.
History: Adopted as 33, December 1959, 30 O.B.A.J. 2091, 2092 (1957). Statutory
citation in first group of "Authorities" changed to "6 O.S.A. § 414" from "6 O.S.A.
§ 108(f)" to reflect statutory amendment, December 3, 1966, Resolution No. 4, 1966 Real
Property Committee, 37 O.B.A.J. 2382, 2383 (1966) and adopted by House of Delegates,
id. at 2538, 2539. Substantial changes in second paragraph of standard recommended by
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If an instrument relating to real property is executed on behalf of a
corporation, there are certain formalities which must be observed in or-
der for the conveyance to be valid and recordable. By statute, the instru-
ment must be signed by an attorney-in-fact or by a president or vice-
president.46 Although the practice varies around the state, it is generally
agreed that a person holding the title of "Senior Vice-President" or "Ex-
ecutive Vice-President" is the equivalent of a president or vice-president.
It is not universally agreed that an "Assistant Vice-President" is the
equivalent of a president or vice-president. However, it should be noted
that the language of Section 93 of Title 16 of the Oklahoma Statutes was
changed from "a vice president" to "any vice president," effective June
24, 1987.47
Unless the instrument is executed by an attorney-in-fact, the statute
requires an attestation by a secretary, assistant secretary or clerk of the
corporation, or in the case of a bank, by a secretary, assistant secretary,
clerk, cashier, or assistant cashier. The corporate seal must also be
attached.48
Some practicing attorneys think that a conveyance by a corporation
must be acknowledged for it to be valid between the parties and to be
recordable. Since, according to statute, documents cannot be accepted
by the county clerk for filing without an acknowledgment, this omission
is not likely to occur.49
2. Practicalities
This is another Standard which allows the title to improve with the
passage of time. Certain execution defects for instruments which have
1983 Title Examination Standards Committee, 54 O.B.A.J. 2379, 2381-82 (1983), approved
by Real Property Section, November 3, 1983, and adopted by House of Delegates, Novem-
ber 4, 1983. The final Comment was added by the Real Property Section before its
approval.
In 1986, the Oklahoma Legislature revised Title 18. As a result, the 1987 Title Stan-
dards Committee recommended changing many of the statutory citations included in this
standard. It was also recommended that the fifth (now sixth) paragraph of the body of the
standard be amended to reflect the change in significance of the subject matter of that
paragraph prior to and after the 1986 amendments, 58 O.B.A.J. 3839, 2842 (1987). These
recommendations were approved by the Real Property Section, November 12, 1987, and
adopted by the House of Delegates, November 13, 1987.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, ch. 1, app. (Supp. 1988).
46. OKLA. STAT. tit. 16 § 93 (Supp. 1988).
47. Id. See generally A. DuRBIN & C. BIXLER, OKLAHOMA REAL ESTATE FoRMs PRACTICE
(1987).
48. OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, § 94 (1981).
49. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
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been on record for more than five years can be accepted without require-
ment. These defects include the failure of the proper corporate officer to
sign, the absence of the corporate seal, the lack of acknowledgment or
any defect in the execution, acknowledgment, recording, or certificate of
recording. If the instrument has been on record for less than five years, it
must adhere strictly to the requirements for execution, attestation, and
acknowledgment. Instruments which are defective should be corrected
and properly recorded.
A special problem occurs with the execution by an attorney-in-fact.
First of all, a power of attorney must be executed and attested in the
same manner as any other deed or conveyance and filed in the office of
the county clerk before the executed instrument becomes effective. There
is not a five-year presumption of validity for an instrument executed by
an attorney-in-fact where the power of attorney is not recorded in the
county records. There is a minority view that not only must the power of
attorney be recorded before the executed instrument becomes effective,
but it also must be recorded before the executed instrument is recorded.
The minority view stands for the proposition that there is no relation
back, and the only proper cure is to have the instrument itself recorded
again after the power of attorney is recorded. Finally, as previously men-
tioned, some attorneys believe that a corporate conveyance must be ac-
knowledged for it to be valid even between the parties. The impact of
this will affect operating agreements which typically are not executed and
acknowledged in the same manner as a corporate deed.
J. Standard 9.4. Recital of Identity or Successorship (adopted 1980;
last amended 1987)
Absent the recording of the certificate required by 18 O.S.A.
§ 1144, a recital of identity, contained in a title document of record
properly executed, attested and sealed by a corporation whose identity
is recited or which recites that it is the successor by merger, corporate
change of name, or was formerly known by another name, may be
relied upon unless there is some reason disclosed of record to doubt the
truth of the recital."0
50. OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, ch. 1, app. (Supp. 1988). The Comments to Standard 9.4 state:
Authority: 18 O.S.A. § 1144 (effective November 1, 1987) & § 1088.
Comment: While there seems to be no exact precedent for this standard, it is justified as
a parallel to Standard 5.3 and as an extension of Standard 9.1.
History: The standard was recommended by the 1980 Title Examination Standards
Committee, 51 O.B.A.J. 2726, 2727 (1980). It was approved by the Real Property Section,
December 3, 1980, and adopted by the House of Delegates, December 5, 1980. The Au-
thority was added by the Editor of the Title Examination Standards at the suggestion of
[Vol. 24:547
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The Oklahoma General Corporation Act, Section 1088 of Title 18,
makes it clear that in the event of merger or consolidation of corpora-
tions, all rights and obligations of each corporation shall be vested in the
corporation resulting from the merger or consolidation."1 The language
of Section 1088 is substantially the same as its predecessor, Section 1.167,
which was repealed upon enactment of the General Corporation Act.
5 2
There is no express statutory authority allowing a title examiner to
rely on a self-serving recital of successorship in a conveyance. It should
be noted that certificates of merger from secretaries of state have often
been encountered in abstracts and relied upon by examiners in prior
years. However, there is apparently no legal authority allowing an exam-
iner to rely on this certificate giving constructive notice to third parties.
However, some authority was granted for the filing of and reliance on
certain merger documents, in particular: (1) the affidavit statute was
passed in 1985 allowing the filing of affidavits covering the "history of the
organization of corporations," and (2) a recent amendment was made,
effective November 1, 1987, to the General Corporation Act whereby a
certificate of merger or consolidation must be filed in the local land
records where the surviving or resulting corporation has title to real
property.5 3
2. Practicalities
Standard 9.4 is helpful to the examiner in allowing reliance upon the
recital of identity of a corporate successor by merger or corporate change
of name in dealing with corporate conveyances. The only warning is that
it may be relied upon unless there is some reason disclosed of record to
Richard Cleverdon, Tulsa, the chairman of the 1980 Title Examination Standards
Committee.
As a result of the extensive revision of Title 18 effective November 1, 1986, the report of
the 1987 Title Standards Committee recommended the amendment of this standard, 58
O.B.A.J. 2839, 2842-43 (1987). The recommendation was approved by the Real Property
Section, November 12, 1987, and adopted by the House of Delegates, November 13, 1987.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, ch. 1, app. (Supp. 1988).
51. OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, § 1088 (Supp. 1988). Section 1088 states that, in the event of a merger
or consolidation of corporations:
[A]II and singular, the rights, privileges, powers and franchises of each of said corpora-
tions, and all property, real, personal and mixed, and all debts... belonging to each of
such corporations shall be vested in the corporation surviving or resulting from such
merger or consolidation; ... all rights of creditors and all liens upon any property of any
said constituent corporations shall be preserved unimpaired....
Id.
52. OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, §§ 1001-1144 (Supp. 1988).
53. OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, § 1144 (Supp. 1988).
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doubt the truth of the recital. Conveyances which make a recital of iden-
tity or successorship can make the opinion less cluttered by a long list of
presumptions of corporate identities.
K. Standard 10.L Conveyances To and By Partners (adopted 1946;
last amended 1966)
Under the Uniform Partnership Act, enacted by the 1955 Legisla-
ture, which became effective on June 3, 1955, a partnership constitutes
a separate entity authorized to take, hold and convey real estate, 54
O.S.A. §§ 208-210. H.B. 698, enacted by the 1965 Legislature, amend-
ig Sections 208(3) and 210(1), validates conveyances to and from
partnerships executed prior to June 3, 1955, unless such conveyances
are invalid for reasons other than lack of legal capacity or because the
partnership was not at the time a legal entity.
Such conveyances to a partnership using the partnership firm or
trade name as grantee of real property or any interest therein, and con-
veyances by a partnership in the partnership firm or trade name as
grantor of real property or any interest therein held in the partnership
firm or trade name, should not be rejected or questioned on the basis
that a partnership was not a legal entity having capacity to take or
convey title to real property or an interest therein."4
1. Background
The legislature has the authority to define whether a fictional "per-
son," such as a corporation, can be treated as a real person. Until June 3,
1955, a partnership was not a separate entity but a group of individuals
holding title to real property as individual tenants in common. 55 After
June 3, 1955, a partnership can and must hold title in the name of the
partnership itself. Absent express restrictions filed of record, any partner
can be relied on to validly convey or encumber the title as the agent of all
the other partners.5 6
54. OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, ch. 1, app. (Supp. 1988). The Comments to Standard 10.1 state:
Authority: 54 O.S.A. §§ 208-210.
History: Adopted as 17, November 16, 1946, 17 O.B.A.J. 1729 (1946), printed, id. at
1753; became 19 on renumbering in 1948, 19 O.B.A.J. 223, 226 (1948); amended December
8, 1955, 27 O.B.A.J. 176 (1956). Substantially amended December 2, 1965. Resolution No.
8, 1965 Real Property Committee, 36 O.B.A.J. 2094 & 2182 (1965), and Exhibit E, id. at
2098 & 2186. Approved by Real Property Section and adopted by House of Delegates, 37
O.B.A.J. 437, 438 (1966).
OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, ch. 1, app. (Supp. 1988).
55. Sanguin v. Wallace, 234 P.2d 394, 397 (Okla. 1951) (citing OKLA. STAT. tit 54, §§ 81, 83
(1941)).
56. OKLA. STAT. tit. 54, §§ 208-10 (1981).
[Vol. 24:547
34




Standard 10.1 validates any conveyance to a partnership both before
and after the effective date of the statute.
L. Standard 10.2. Identity of Partners of Fictitious Name Partnership
(adopted 1946; last amended 1986)
Identity of partners of a fictitious name partnership may be estab-
lished by reference to the latest certificate of fictitious name partner-
ship filed in the office of the county clerk in the county in which the
land is located as of the date of conveyance in the partnership name. If
the certificate of fictitious name has not been fied in the county where
the land is located, a certified copy of the certificate of fictitious name
partnership fied in the office of the county clerk of the county of the
principal place of business of the partnership, or a copy of the current
articles of partnership, should be examined.5 7
1. Background
Since the names of the members of a fictitious name partnership are
not disclosed by the name itself, the title examiner is unable to determine
whether the person signing and acknowledging a conveyance of partner-
ship real property is a member of the partnership. The acknowledgment
for an individual as an individual must be based on "personal knowl-
edge" or "satisfactory evidence" that "the person appearing before the
officer and making the acknowledgment is the person whose true signa-
ture is on the instrument."5 8 However, it is inadequate to know that
"Sally Smith" is really "Sally Smith," if the real question is whether
"Sally Smith" is a current general partner of "XYZ, a partnership."
Section 81 of Title 54 of the Oklahoma Statutes requires that every
57. OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, ch. 1, app. (Supp. 1988). The Comments to Standard 10.2 state:
Authority: 54 O.S.A. §§ 81-86.
History: Adopted as 17, November 16, 1946, 17 O.B.A.J. 1729 (1946), printed, id. at
1753; became 19 on renumbering in 1948, 19 O.B.A.J. 223, 226 (1948); amended December
8, 1955, 27 O.B.A.J. 176 (1956). Substantially amended December 2, 1965. Resolution
No. 8, 1965 Real Property Committee, 36 O.B.A.J 2094 & 2182 (1965), and Exhibit E, id.
at 2098 & 2186. Approved by Real Property Section and adopted by House of Delegates,
37 O.B.A.J. 437, 438 (1966). Further amendments proposed by the 1985 Report of the
Title Examination Standards Committee, 56 O.B.J. 2537 (1985), proposal amended by
Real Property Section, November 14, 1985, and adopted by House of Delegates, as
amended by the Section, November 15, 1985, 57 O.B.J. 5 (1986).
OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, ch. 1, app. (Supp. 1988).
58. OKLA. STAT. tit. 49, § 113(A) (Supp. 1988).
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fictitious name partnership file a certificate giving the full names and ad-
dresses of all members of the partnership together with proof of publica-
tion in the county clerk's office of its principal place of business.5 9 Any
fictitious name partnership failing to make such filing and publication
cannot maintain any lawsuit concerning an account or contract entered
into in the name of the partnership until such filing and publication is
completed. If a fictitious name partnership holds title to real property
outside the county where its principal place of business is located, and no
certificate has been filed in the county where the property is located, the
title examiner will need to get a copy of such certificate from the county
clerk where the business is located. Alternatively, the title examiner
could obtain a copy of the then-current articles of partnership from the
partnership itself, identifying the names of the general partners.
2. Practicalities
Standard 10.2 is useful in advising the client where to find the iden-
tity of the partners of a fictitious name partnership when such identity is
important to the marketability of title.
M. Standard 12.5. Money Judgments Filed Against an Oil and Gas
Leasehold Interest (adopted 1986; no amendments)
The interest vested in the owner of an oil and gas leasehold estate
is not real estate within the meaning of 12 O.S.A. § 706; therefore, a
money judgment filed in the office of the county clerk of the county in
which the oil and gas leasehold is located does not create a lien on said
oil and gas leasehold. 6°
1. Background
In First National Bank v. Dunlap,61 the Oklahoma Supreme Court
59. OKLA. STAT. tit. 54, § 81 (Supp. 1988). Section 81 provides:
[E]very partnership transacting business in this state under a fictitious name, or a designa-
tion not showing the names of the persons interested as partners in such business, must file
for recording with the county clerk of the county or subdivision in which its principal place
of business is stated, a certificate, stating the names in full of all the members of such
partnership, and their places of residence, together with proof of publication ....
Id
60. OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, ch. 1, app. (Supp. 1988). The Comments to Standard 12.5 state:
Authority: First National Bank of Healdton v. Dunlap, 122 Okla. 288 (1927); Hinds v.
Phillips Petroleum Company, 591 P.2d 697 (Okla. 1979).
History: This standard was recommended by the 1986 Report of the Title Examination
Standards Committee, 57 O.B.J. 2677, 2682 (1986). It was approved by the Real Property
Section, November 20, 1986, and adopted by the House of Delegates, November 21, 1986.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, ch. 1, app. (Supp. 1988).
61. 122 Okla. 288, 254 P. 729 (1927).
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interpreted the term "real estate," used in what is now Title 12, Section
706 of the Oklahoma Statutes,62 to exclude oil and gas leases. The court
held that although an oil and gas lease is an interest or estate in real
estate, it is not real estate itself and therefore not included in the judg-
ment creditor's lien under the statute.63 In 1979, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court reaffirmed this position in Hinds v. Phillips Petroleum Co.64 The
court summarized First National Bank v. Dunlap by stating, "A judg-
ment lien will not attach to an oil and gas lease.",65
2. Practicalities
Standard 12.5, adopted in 1986, brought the cases cited above to the
attention of title examiners. It is now well settled that a money judgment
filed with the county clerk does not create a lien on an oil and gas lease-
hold. Therefore, it is not necessary to use the same approach against a
leasehold estate as would be used against a surface or mineral interest
owner in the property. Until an actual execution is made on the lease-
hold estate, the estate could be sold to an owner with knowledge of the
money judgment prior to the institution of an execution for sale. This is
particularly useful in the Purchase Opinion, where a money judgment is
filed against the seller's name.
N. Standard 13.8. Unenforceable Mortgages and Marketable Title
(adopted 1980; last amended 1986)
A. No mortgage, contract for deed or deed of trust barred under
the provisions of 46 O.S.A. § 301 shall constitute a defect in determin-
ing marketable record title.
B. A mortgage, contract for deed or deed of trust showing on its
62. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 706 (Supp. 1987).
63. First National Bank v. Dunlap, 122 Okla. 288, 290, 254 P. 729, 732 (1927). The court
stated:
But the statute [§ 690 C.O.S. 1921] provides that the judgment creditor shall have a lien
upon "real estate" owned by the judgment debtor in the county. The plaintiff in error
would have this court go to the extent of holding that all and every kind of estate recog-
nized in the law, which one, individual or corporate, may have in real property is itself real
estate within the meaning of said section. While unquestionably such an oil and gas lease
creates an interest or an estate in the realty, that interest or estate is not "real estate" in the
sense in which the said section 690, supra, uses this terminology. It would unquestionably
be within the power of the legistlative body to make a judgment a lien upon every conceiva-
ble estate recognized by the law as capable of being owned by natural as well as coporate
persons. But the statute relied upon as fixing the lien upon the interest of the defendant
Dunlap in the realty created by the oil and gas lease does not go to that extent.
Id.
64. 591 P.2d 697 (Okla. 1979).
65. Id. at 699 n.5.
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face that it secures a debt payable on demand shall be deemed to be
due on the date of its execution. Thus, the date of execution shall be
deemed to be "the date of the last maturing obligation" for the purpose
of 46 O.S.A. § 301, unless an extension has been filed of record pursu-
ant to such statute.66
1. Background
In order to avoid costly legal actions to extinguish ancient unre-
leased mortgages, the legislature enacted Title 46, Section 301 of the
Oklahoma Statutes.67 Absent contrary notice as provided in the statute,
Section 301 allows title examiners to ignore recorded mortgages with ex-
pressed maturity dates on their faces if they are over ten years past such
maturity date. Recorded mortgages with no expressed maturity date can
be ignored if they have been recorded for over thirty years at the time of
examination.
A question by a title examiner about the extinguishment date for
mortgages relating to "demand notes" under Title 46, Section 301 of the
Oklahoma Statutes68 led to a discussion of what date is "the date of the
last maturing obligation" under that statute. Title 12A, Section 3-
122(1)(b) of the Oklahoma Statutes provides that in the case of a demand
instrument, a cause of action against a maker or acceptor accrues upon
its date, or if no date is stated, on the date issued.69 Therefore, Standard
13.8 was revised to show that a mortgage relating to a demand note is
extinguished ten years after its execution date.
2. Practicalities
Standard 13.8 is probably more practically useful than any other
Standard. A base abstract will normally include a patent, a few deeds,
some oil and gas leases, easements, and mortgages and releases with
many potential defects in relation thereto. According to Title 46, Section
66. OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, ch. 1, app. (Supp. 1988). The Comments to Standard 13.8 state:
Authority: 12A O.S.A. § 3-122(2).
History: The standard was recommended by the 1980 Title Examination Standards
Committee, 51 O.B.J. 2726, 2727 (1980). It was approved by the Real Property Section,
December 3, 1980, and adopted by the House of Delegates, December 5, 1980. The second
paragraph of the standard was recommended by the Report of the 1986 Title Examination
Standards Committee, 57 O.B.J. 2677, 2682 (1986). It was approved by the Real Property
Section, November 20, 1986, and adopted by the House of Delegates, November 21, 1986.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, ch. 1, app. (Supp. 1988).
67. OKLA. STAT. tit. 46, § 301 (Supp. 1988).
68. Id.
69. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 3-122(l)(b) (1981).
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301 of the Oklahoma Statutes, 70 many of these mortgages will be
unenforceable.
However, one cautionary statement is necessary. Old mortgages are
usually shown only in abstracted versions without the due date, although
it is not stated that the due date is not shown on the actual instrument.
For example, if you examine an abstracted version of a 1955 mortgage
and no due date is shown by the abstracter, the examiner cannot be sure
that the instrument itself actually contained no due date unless the ab-
stracter specifically states such in the abstracted version. If the 1955
mortgage does not contain a due date, the mortgage may be ignored in
1985. If the due date of 1985 appears on the instrument but is not shown
by the abstracter, the mortgage cannot be ignored until 1995 unless a
copy of the mortgage is acquired and the due date or absence thereof has
been determined.
0. Standards 18.1 - 18.6. Simplification of Land Titles Act (adopted
1962, last amended 1983)
18.1. REMEDIAL EFFECT
The Simplication of Land Titles Act is remedial in character and
should be relied upon with respect to such claims or imperfections of
title as fall within its scope.
7 1
70. OKLA. STAT. tit. 46, § 301 (Supp. 1988).
71. OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, ch. 1, app. (Supp. 1988). The Comments to Standard 18.1 state:
Authority: Lane v. Travelers Ins. Co., 230 Iowa 973, 299 N.W. 553 (1941); Wichelman
v. Messner, 250 Minn. 88, 83 N.W.2d 800, 71 A.L.R.2d 816 (1957); L. Simes & C. Taylor,
The Improvement of Conveyancing by Legislation 271 (1960); P. Basye, Clearing Land
Titles § 374 (1953), & § 182 (1962 Pock. Part); R. & C. Patton, Titles § 563 (2d ed. 1957);
Ashabranner, An Introduction to Oklahoma's First Comprehensive Land Title Simplifica-
tion Law, 14 Okla. L. Rev. 516 (1961).
Comment: 1. The Simplification of Land Titles Act is similar to a recording statute. It
is similar to the marketable title acts adopted in Michigan, Minnesota, Iowa and other
states, which have been held constitutional on the grounds that the legislature, which has
the power to pass recording stautes originally, can amend or alter those statutes and re-
quire recording or the filing of a notice of claim to give notice of existing interests, and can
extinguish claims of those who fail to re-record, Lane v. Travelers Ins. Co., 230 Iowa 973,
299 N.W. 553 (1941); Wichelman v. Messner, 250 Minn. 88, 83 N.W.2d 800, 71 A.L.R.2d
816 (1957); L. Simes & C. Taylor, The Improvement of Conveyancing by Legislation, 271
(1960); P. Basye, Clearing Land Titles, § 374 (1953), & § 186 (2d ed. 1970); R. & C. Pat-
ton, Titles § 563 (2d ed. 1957). In many situations the Simplification Act operates against
defects made in the past by parties trying to complete the transaction correctly but who
failed to do so in every detail. It will give effect to the intentions of the parties which were
bona fide. Usually a full consideration was paid. To this extent the results will be those of
a curative statute. A similar curative statute in Oklahoma, 16 O.S.A. § 4, has been held
constitutional, Saak v. Hicks, 321 P.2d 425 (Okla. 1958). In a few situations the Act will
operate against defects considered jurisdictional. In the past, a statute of limitations, with
its requirements of adverse possession, followed by a suit to quiet title was considered
necessary to eliminate jurisdictional defects. The Simplification Act provides a new and
additional method by invalidating the claim and creating marketable title unless claimant
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18.2. PROTECTION AFFORDED BY THE ACT
The Simplification of Land Titles Act protects any purchaser for
value, with or without actual or constructive notice, from one claiming
under a conveyance or decree recorded, or entered for ten (10) years or
more in the county as against adverse claims arising out of:
A. (1) Conveyances of incompetent persons unless the county or
court records reflect a determination of incompetency or the appoint-
ment of a guardian, (2) corporate conveyances to an officer without
authority, (3) conveyances executed under recorded power of attorney
which has terminated for reasons not shown in the county records,
(4) nondelivery of a conveyance;
B. Guardian's, executor's, or administrator's conveyances ap-
proved or confirmed by the court as against (1) named wards, (2) the
State of Oklahoma, or any other person claiming under the estate of a
named decedent, the heirs, devisees, representatives, successors, as-
signs or creditors;
C. Decrees of distribution or partition of a decedent's estate as
against the estates of decedents, the heirs, devisees, successors, assigns
or creditors. For decrees of distribution or partition which cover land
in a county other than the county in which such decrees are entered
and recorded, 16 O.S.A. § 62(c)(2) does not require that they also be
recorded in the county in which the land is located;
D. (1) Sheriff's or marshal's deeds executed pursuant to an or-
der of court having jurisdiction over the land, (2) final judgments of
courts determining and adjudicating ownership of land or partitioning
same, (3) receiver's conveyances executed pursuant to an order of any
court having jurisdiction, (4) trustee's conveyances referring to a trust
agreement or named beneficiaries or indicating a trust where the agree-
ment is not of record, (5) certificate tax deeds or resale tax deeds exe-
cuted by the county treasurer, as against any person or the heirs,
devisees, personal representatives, successors or assigns named as a de-
fendant in the judgment preceding the sheriff's or marshal's deed, or
files notice of claim within the time provided in the act (or is in actual possession of the
land). Since the Act protects the rights of claimants in actual possession as against a pur-
chaser, the reasoning in Williams v. Bailey 268 P.2d 868 (Okla. 1954), reading a require-
ment for adverse possession into the tax recording statute, is not applicable.
2. Where a seller does not have a marketable title due to defects for which the Act
affords protection to a "purchaser for value," and no notice has been filed as required by
the Act, the attorney for the purchaser may advise the purchaser that a purchase for value
will afford protection of the Act and that such a purchaser will acquire a valid and market-
able title, provided no one is in possession claiming adversely to the seller.
History: The 1962 Real Property Committee Report recommended the adoption of this
standard, see Recommendation (2), 33 O.B.A.J. 2157 (1962) and Exhibit B, id. at 2162.
Approved by Real Property Section and House of Delegates, id. at 2469, November 29,
1962.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, ch. 1, app. (Supp. 1988).
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determining and adjudicating ownership of or partitioning land, or set-
tlor, trustee or beneficiary of a trust, and owners or claimants of land
subject to tax deeds, unless claimant is in possession of the land, either
personally or by a tenant, or files a notice of claim prior to such
purchase, or within "one year from October 27, 1961, the effective date
of 16 O.S.A. §§ 61-66 or from October 1, 1973, the effective date of 16
O.S.A. § 62 as amended in 1973." The State of Oklahoma and its
political subdivisions or a public service corporation or transmission
company with facilities installed in, over, across or under the land are
deemed to be in possession. 72
18.3. PURCHASER FOR VALUE
"Purchaser for value" within the meaning of the Simplication of
Land Titles Act, refers to one who has paid value in money or money's
worth. It does not refer to a gift or transfer involving a nominal
consideration.7 3
18.4. CONVEYANCE OF RECORD
"Conveyance of record" within the meaning of the Simplification
of Land Titles Act includes a recorded warranty deed, deed, quitclaim
deed, mineral deed, mortgage, lease, oil and gas lease, contract of sale,
easement, or right-of-way deed or agreement.74
72. OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, ch. 1, app. (Supp. 1988). The Comments to Standard 18.2 state:
Authority: 16 O.S.A. §§ 62 & 66.
History: The 1962 Real Property Committee Report recommended the adoption of this
standard, see Recommendation (2), 33 O.B.A.J. 2157 (1962) and Exhibit B, id. at 2163.
Approved by Real Property Section and House of Delegates, id at 2469, November 29,
1962.
The 1980 Title Examination Standards Committee recommended changes in the stan-
dard to reflect the broadening effect made in legislative changes of 1973 and 16 O.S.A.
§ 62, 51 O.BJ. 2726, 2728. The Real Property Section, on December 3, 1980, made some
changes in style but also deleted the word "county" before "court records" in "A.(1)" and
added the last sentence in "C." As amended, the standard was approved by the Real
Property Section, December 3, 1980, and adopted by the House of Delegates, December 5,
1980.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, ch. 1, app. (Supp. 1988).
73. OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, ch. 1, app. (Supp. 1988). The Comments to Standard 18.3 state:
Authority: Noe v. Smith, 67 Okla. 211, 169 P. 1108, L.R.A. 1918C, 435 (1917); Ex-
change Bank of Perry v. Nichols, 196 Okla. 283, 164 P.2d 867 (1945).
Comment: The title acquired by a "purchaser for value" within the meaning of the
Simplification of Land Titles Act will descend or may be devised or transferred without
involving "value" and without loss of the benefits of the act.
History: The 1962 Real Property Committee Report recommended the adoption of this
standard, see Recommendation (2), 33 O.B.AJ. 2157 (1962) and Exhibit B, id at 2164.
Approved by Real Property Section and House of Delegates, id at 2469, November 29,
1962.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, ch. 1, app. (Supp. 1988).
74. OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, ch. 1, app. (Supp. 1988). The Comments to Standard 18.4 state:
Authority: 16 O.S.A. § 62(a).
Comment: The definition of a conveyance of record should not be less than the defini-
tion of an interest in real estate in 16 O.S.A. § 62(a).
History: The 1962 Real Property Committee Report recommended the adoption of this
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18.5. EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE ACT
The Simplification of Land Titles Act became effective October
27, 1961. Notices under the Act required to be filed within one
(1) year from the effective date of the act must be filed for record in the
county clerk's office in the county or counties where the land is situ-
ated on or before October 26, 1962.75
18.6. ABSTRACTING
Abstracting relating to court proceedings under the Simplification
of Land Titles Act, 16 O.S.A. § 62(b), (c) & (d), when the instruments
have been entered or recorded for ten (10) years or more, as provided
in the statute, shall be considered sufficient when there is shown the
following in the abstract:
A. In sales by guardians, executors or administrators, the deed
and order confirming the sale.
B. In probate and partition proceedings in district court, the fi-
nal decree and estate tax clearance unless not required by 58 O.S.A.
§ 912(3) or 68 O.S.A. § 815(d) or unless the estate tax lien is barred.
C. In general jurisdiction court sales under execution, the peti-
tion and other instruments, if any, showing defendants sued, the ser-
vice upon defendants or their entry of appearance, the judgment, the
deed and the court order directing the delivery thereof.
D. In general jurisdiction court partitions, or adjudications of
ownership, the petition and other instruments, if any, showing defend-
ants sued, the service upon defendants or their entry of appearance, the
final judgment, any deed on partition, and any court order directing
the delivery thereof.
The abstractor can make in substance the following notation:
"other proceedings herein omitted by reason of 16 O.S.A. § 61, et seq.,
and Title Examination Standards Chapter 18. ,76
standard, see Recommendation (2), 33 O.B.A.J. 2157 (1962) and Exhibit B, id. at 2162.
Approved by Real Property Section and House of Delegates, id. at 2469, November 29,
1962.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, ch. 1, app. (Supp. 1988).
75. OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, ch. 1, app. (Supp. 1988). The Comments to Standard 18.5 state:
Authority: 16 O.S.A. §§ 62 & 63.
Comment: An adverse claimant may avoid the effects of the act by being in possession
of the land, either personally or by tenant, or by filing the notice of claim required in
Section 63, within ten years of the recording of the conveyance, or entry (or recording) of
the decree under which the claim of valid and marketable title is to be made, or within one
year of the effective date of the Act, whichever date occurs last. The filing of the notice of
claim takes the interest or claim out from under the operation of the Act.
History: The 1962 Real Property Committee Report recommended the adoption of this
standard, see Recommendation (2), 33 O.B.A.J. 2157 (1962) and Exhibit B, id. at 2164.
Approved by Real Property Section and House of Delegates, id. at 2469, November 29,
1962.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, ch. 1, app. (Supp. 1988).
76. OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, ch. 1, app. (Supp. 1988). The Comments to Standard 18.6 state:
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The Simplification of Land Titles Act allows the title examiner to
ignore certain record title defects if they have been of record at least ten
years. The Act protects any purchaser for value (not a person who ac-
quired the land as a gift or for a nominal consideration) even with actual
or constructive notice of any defect listed in Standard 18.2 above.
The applicability of the Act to severed mineral interests was dis-
cussed but not decided by the Oklahoma Court of Appeals in Clark v.
Powell.7" Clark involved the application of the Act to validating a 1937
probate decree and a 1938 quiet title suit which covered both the surface
and all minerals. A previous deed leading to the probate decree reserved
a one-third mineral interest in one of three children. In its modification
of the decision, the court of appeals held that although the judgments
relied upon would ordinarily qualify for protection under the Act, the
Act did not apply to the facts of the case.78
The facts which disqualified the judgments from protection were
that the one-third mineral interest was a severed mineral interest and
thereby free of the operation of the Act, the probate court had no juris-
diction over interests not held by the deceased at the time of death, and
the quiet title suit court had no jurisdiction over the owner of the one-
Authority: 16 O.S.A. § 62(a), (c) & (d).
Comments: The foregoing will disclose all showing needed under the applicable statu-
tory provisions and the standards in this chapter.
Caveat: If the final decree is incomplete, uncertain, vague or ambiguous, the same is
subject to judicial interpretation, notwithstanding the rule that a decree of distribution
made by the court having jurisdiction of the settlement of a testator's estate, entered after
due notice and hearing, is conclusive, in the absence of fraud, mistake or collusion, as to
the rights of parties interested in the estate to all portions of the estate therby ordered, and
capable of being then distributed under, the Will, unless reversed or modified on appeal
and that such decree is not subject to collateral attack. In case the final decree is incom-
plete, uncertain, vague or ambiguous, the title examiner is justified in requiring a full tran-
script of such proceedings.
History: Adopted, December, 1964. Printed as Proposal No. 5 of the 1964 Real Prop-
erty Committee, 35 O.B.A.J. 2045 (1964) and see Exhibit E, id at 2050-51. Approved,
upon recommendation of Real Property Section, by House of Delegates, 36 O.B.A.J. 179,
182 (1965). As a result of a proposal by the 1970 Real Property Committee's Supplemental
Report, printed as Exhibit C, 41 O.B.A.J. 2676-77 (1970), approved by the Real Property
Section on December 3, 1970, and adopted by the House of Delegates on December 4,
1970,42 O.B.AJ. 706 (1971), a short paragraph was dropped from "Comments". Its sense
was carried over and expanded into the "Caveat" which was added by the same action.
The 1983 Report of the Title Examination Standards Committee recommended substantial
change in "B." of the standard, 54 O.B.J. 2379, 2383 (1983). The recommendation was
approved by the Real Property Section, November 3, 1983, and adopted by the House of
Delegates November 4, 1983.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, ch. 1, app. (Supp. 1988).
77. Clark v. Powell, 52 OKLA. BJ. 2584 (Okla. Ct. App. 1981), modified 53 OKLA. B.J. 738
(Okla. Ct. App. 1982), withdrawn 53 OKLA. B.J. 879 (Okla. Ct. App. 1982).
78. Clark, 53 OKLA. B.J. at 739.
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third severed mineral interest because it was a default judgment and no
allegations of adverse possession of the minerals were made.
The court of appeals also said, in regard to the parties attempting to
rely on the Act, "None are 'purchasers for value' within the meaning of
the Act."79 The opinion was allowed to stand but was subsequently
withdrawn from publication. This suggests that the Oklahoma Supreme
Court agreed with the result but not necessarily the reasoning. There-
fore, one can conclude that before this Act can apply to surface or miner-
als, severed or not, there must be an intervening "purchaser for value."
2. Practicalities
The most practical use of this Standard involves final decrees or de-
crees of distribution that have been recorded for more than ten years. If
a final decree is recorded for less than ten years, full probate or adminis-
tration proceedings should be examined before relying on the final de-
cree. At the anniversary of the tenth year of recordation, Standard 18
allows the examiner to rely on the validity of the final decree assuming
other aspects of the statutes are met.
One ironic implication is that the oil and gas lessee may be protected
although the lessor is not protected if that lessor is not a purchaser for
value. In this case, a lessee who asserts the marketability of the lease
may then suspend the payment of proceeds to the lessor of that lease.
Standard 18 is also useful in examining other court decrees that
have been recorded more than ten years. The title examiner must be
careful that the adverse claimant is a named defendant to the court ac-
tion and that there is an intervening purchaser for value.
P. Standards 19.1 - 19.13. Marketable Record Title Act (adopted
1964; last amended 1988)
19.1. REMEDIAL EFFECT
The Marketable Record Title Act is remedial in character and
should be relied upon as a cure or remedy for such imperfections of
title as fall within its scope.80
79. Id. at 740.
80. OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, ch. 1, app. (Supp. 1988). The Comments to Standard 19.1 state:
Authority: Marketable Record Title Act, 16 O.S.A. §§ 71-80; L. Simes & C. Taylor,
Model Title Standards, Standard 4.1 at 24 (1960); P. Basye, Clearing Land Titles §§ 186 &
374 (2d ed. 1970); R. & C. Patton, Titles § 563 (2d ed. 1957); L. Simes & C. Taylor, The
Improvement of Conveyancing by Legislation 253 (1960); L. Simes, The Improvement of
Conveyancing: Recent Developments, 34 O.B.AJ. 2357 (1963), I.c.p. 2363; "Comment,"
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19.2. REQUISITES OF MARKETABLE RECORD TITLE
A Marketable Record Title under the Marketable Record Title
Act exists only where (1) A person has an unbroken chain of title of
record extending back at least thirty (30) years; and (2) Nothing ap-
pears of record purporting to divest such person of title.81
Oklahoma Title Standard, 18.1. The following cases sustain the constitutionality of mar-
ketable title acts: Lane v. Travelers Ins. Co., 230 Iowa 973, 299 N.W. 553 (1941);
Wichelman v. Messner, 250 Minn. 88, 83 N.W.2d 800 (1957); Annot., "Marketable Title
Statutes", 71 A.L.R.2d 846 (1960); Opinion No. 67-444 of the Attorney General of
Oklahoma, dated March 21, 1968, 39 O.B.AJ. 593-595 (1968).
Similar standards: Ill., 22; Iowa, 10.1: Mich., 1.1; Minn. 61; Nebr., 42; N.D. 1.13; S.D.
34; Wis., 4.
Caveat: Whether or not the provisons of the Marketable Record Title Act may be relied
upon to cure or remedy such imperfections of title as fall within its scope, which imperfec-
tions occurred or arose during the time title to the land was in a tribe of Indians or held in
trust by the United States for a tribe of Indians or a member or members thereof, or was
restricted against alienation by treaty or by act of Congress, is a matter for determination
by Congress or by a federal court in a case to which the United States is properly made a
party. Until such determination, the Marketable Record Title Act should not be relied
upon to cure or remedy such imperfections. See: Section 1, Oklahoma Enabling Act,
§ 134 Stat. 267 (1906); Okla. Const., art. 1, § 3; W. Semple, Oklahoma Indian Land Titles
§ 53 (1952). However, it is possible that the federal courts will consider the Marketable
Title Act to be a statute of limitations within the meaning of the Act of April 12, 1926,
with respect to the Five Civilized Tribes.
History: Adopted, December, 1964. Printed as a part of Proposal No. 12 of 1964 Real
Property Committee, 35 O.B.A.J. 2045, 2046 (1964) and see Exhibit H, id. at 2052. Ap-
proved, upon recommendation of Real Property Section, by House of Delegates, 36
O.B.AJ. 179, 182 (1965). Last sentence of "Caveat" added December 2, 1965. Resolution
No. 3, 1965 Real Property Committee, 36 O.B.A.J. 2094 & 2182 (1965). Approved by
Real Property Section and adopted by House of Delegates, 37 O.B.A.J. 437 (1966). A.L.R.
citation added to Authorities, December 3, 1966. Resolution No. 3, 1966 Real Property
Committee, 37 O.B.A.J. 2382, 2383 (1966) and adopted by House of Delegates, 37
O.B.AJ. 2538, 2539 (1966). Opinion of Attorney General added December 1968 on rec-
ommendation of Real Property Committee, Resolution (2) printed at 39 O.B.A.J. 2308
(1968); adopted House of Delegates, 40 O.B.A.J. 585 (1969). Citation of Act amended by
Editor, 1978, to agree with repeal of § 81, 1970 Okla. Sess. Laws, ch. 92, § 5, see Minutes
of House of Delegates for 1977, at 93-96.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, cl. 1, app. (Supp. 1988).
81. OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, ch. 1, app. (Supp. 1988). The Comments to Standard 19.2 state:
Note: See next two standards for a further statement regarding these two requirements.
Authority: 16 O.S.A. §§ 71 & 72; L. Simes & C. Taylor, Model Title Standards, Stan-
dard 4.2, at 24 (1960). See 16 O.S.A. §§ 71, 72, 74 & 78 as to law which became effective
on July 1, 1972.
Similar Standard: Mich., 1.2.
History: Adopted, December, 1964. Printed as a part of Proposal No. 12 or 1964 Real
Property Committee, 35 O.B.A.J. 2045, 2046 (1964) and see Exhibit H, id. at 2052. Ap-
proved, upon recommendation of Real Property Section, by House of Delegates, 36
O.B.A.J. 179, 182 (1965). As a result of a proposal by the 1970 Real Property Committee's
Supplemental Report, printed as Exhibit D, 41 O.B.A.J. 2676, 2677 (1970), approved by
the Real Property Section on December 3, 1970, and adopted by the House of Delegates on
December 4, 1970 the last sentence of the standard calling attention to the amendment
shortening the period to thirty years was added. Pertinent statutory authority, relating to
the amendment has been added by the editor pursuant to the directive in the Committee's
Supplemental Report, 41 O.B.A.J. 2676, 2679 (1970). The 1975 Report of the Real Prop-
erty Section recommended change from "forty" to "thirty" and the deletion of the former
last sentence of the standard which referred to the amendment of the Marketable Title Act
changing the period from forty to thirty years, 46 O.B.A.J. 2131, 2183, 2241 & 2317
1989]
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19.3. UNBROKEN CHAIN OF TITLE OF RECORD
"An unbroken chain of title of record", within the meaning of the
Marketable Record Title Act, may consist of (1) A single conveyance
or other title transaction which purports to create an interest and
which has been a matter of public record for at least thirty (30) years;
or (2) A connected series of conveyances or other title transactions of
public record in which the root of title has been a matter of public
record for at least thirty (30) years.8 2
19.4. MATTERS PURPORTING TO DIVEST
Matters "purporting to divest" within the meaning of the Market-
able Record Title Act are those matters appearing of record which, if
taken at face value, warrant the inference that the interest has been
divested.8 3
(1975). Recommendation adopted by House of Delegates, Minutes of House, December 5,
1975, at 50.
OaA. STAT. tit. 16, ch. 1, app. (Supp. 1988).
82. OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, ch. 1, app. (Supp. 1988). The Comments to Standard 19.3 state:
Authority: 16 O.S.A. § 71(a) & (b); L. Simes & C. Taylor, Model Title Standards,
Standard 4.3, at 25 (1960).
Similar Standard: Mich., 1.3.
Comment: Assume A is the grantee in a deed recorded in 1915 and that nothing affect-
ing the described land has been recorded since then. In 1945 A has an "unbroken chain of
title of record." Instead of a conveyance, the title transaction may be a decree of a district
court or court of general jurisdiction, which was entered in the court records in 1915.
Likewise, in 1945, A has an "unbroken chain of title of record."
Instead of having only a single link, A's chain of title may contain two or more links.
Thus, suppose X is the grantee in a deed recorded in 1915; and X conveyed to Y by deed
recorded in 1925; Y conveyed to A by deed recorded in 1940. In 1945 A has an "unbroken
chain of title of record." Any or all of these links may consist of decrees of a district court
or court of general jurisdiction instead of deeds of conveyance.
The significant time from which the thirty-year record title begins is not the delivery of
the instrument, but the date of its recording. Suppose the deed to A is delivered in 1915
but recorded in 1925. A will not have an "unbroken chain of title of record" until 1955.
Decrees of a court in a county other than where the land lies do not constitute a root of
title until recorded in the county in which the land lies.
For a definition of "root of title" see Marketable Record Title Act, 16 O.S.A. § 78(e).
History: Adopted, December, 1964. Printed as a part of Proposal No. 12 of 1964 Real
Property Committee, 35 O.B.A.J. 2045, 2046 (1964) and see Exhibit H, id. at 2053. Ap-
proved, upon recommendation of Real Property Section, by House of Delegates, 36
O.B.AJ. 179, 182 (1965). As a result of a proposal of the 1970 Real Property Committee's
Supplemental Report printed as Exhibit E, 41 O.B.A.J. 2676, 2678 (1970). Approved by
the Real Property Section on December 3, 1970 and adopted by the House of Delegates on
December 4, 1970, 42 O.B.A.J. 706 (1971), the last sentence of the standard shortening the
period to thirty years was added. Pertinent statutory authority, relating to the amendment,
has been added by the editor pursuant to the directive in the Committee's Supplemental
Report, 41 O.B.A.J. 2676, 2679 (1970). All references to prior 40-year period deleted, 30
years substituted, and dates in "Comments" corrected to agree with 30-year period as per
direction of House of Delegates, see Minutes of House for 1977, at 93-96.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, ch. 1, app. (Supp. 1988).
83. OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, ch. 1, app. (Supp. 1988). The Comments to Standard 19.4 state:
Authority: 16 O.S.A. § 72(d); L. Simes & C. Taylor, Model Title Standards, Standard
4.4, at 26-27 (1960).
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19.5. INTERESTS OR DEFECTS IN THE THIRTY-YEAR
CHAIN
If the recorded title transaction which constitutes the root of title,
or any subsequent instrument in the chain of record title required for a
marketable record title under the terms of the act, creates interests in
third parties or creates defects in the record chain of title, then the
Similar Standard: Mich., 1.4.
Comment: The obvious case of a recorded instrument purporting to divest is a convey-
ance to another person. A is the grantee in a deed recorded in 1915. The record shows a
conveyance of the same tract by A to B in 1925. Then B deeds to X in 1957. Although B
had a thirty-year record chain of title in 1945, the deed to X purports to divest it, and B
thereafter does not have a title.
A recorded instrument may also purport to divest even though there is not a complete
chain of record title connecting the grantee in the divesting instrument with the thirty-year
chain. Suppose A is the last grantee in a recorded chain of title, the last deed of which was
recorded in 1915. A deed of the same land was recorded in 1925, from X to Y, which
recites that A died intestate in 1921 and that X is his only heir. The deed recorded in 1925
is one "purporting to divest" within the terms of the Act. This is the conclusion to be
reached whether the recital of heirship is true or not.
Or suppose, again, that A is the last grantee in a chain of title, the last deed of which was
recorded in 1915. A deed to the same land from X to Y was recorded in 1925, which
contains the following recital: "being the same land heretofore conveyed to me by A."
There is no instrument on record from A to X. This instrument is nevertheless one "pur-
porting to divest" within the terms of the Act.
Suppose that in 1915, A was the last grantee in a recorded chain of title, the deed to him
being recorded in that year. A deed of the same land was recorded in 1925, signed: "A by
B, attorney-in-fact." Even though there is no power of attorney on record, and even
though the recital is untrue, the instrument is one "purporting to divest" within the terms
of the Act.
Suppose that A is the last grantee in a recorded chain of title, the last deed of which was
recorded in 1915. In 1955 there was recorded a deed to Y from X, a stranger to the title,
which recited that X and his predecessors have been "in continuous, open, notorious and
adverse possession of said land as against all the world for the preceding thirty years."
This is an instrument "purporting to divest" A of his interest, within the terms of the Act.
On the other hand, an inconsistent deed on record, is not one "purporting to divest"
within the terms of the Act, if nothing on the record purports to connect it with the thirty-
year chain of title. The following fact situations illustrate this.
A is the last grantee in a recorded chain of title, the last deed of which was recorded in
1915. A warranty deed of the same land from X to Y was recorded in 1925. The latter
deed is not one "purporting to divest" within the terms of the Act.
A is the last grantee in a recorded chain of title, the last deed of which was recorded in
1915. A mortgage from X to Y of the same land, containing covenants of warranty, is
recorded in 1925. The mortgage is not an instrument "purporting to divest" within the
terms of the Act.
Although the recorded instruments in the last two illustrations are not instruments "pur-
porting to divest" the thirty-year title, they are not necessarily nullities. The marketable
record title can be subject to interests, if any, arising from such instruments, 16 O.S.A.
§ 72(d).
History: Adopted, December, 1964. Printed as a part of Proposal No. 12 of 1964 Real
Property Committee, 35 O.B.AJ. 2045, 2046 (1964) and see Exhibit H, id at 2053-54.
Approved, upon recommendation of Real Property Section, by House of Delegates, 36
O.B.AJ. 179, 182 (1965). All references to prior 40-year period deleted, 30 years substi-
tuted, and dates in "Comments" corrected to agree with 30-year period as per direction of
House of Delegates, see Minutes of House for 1977, at 93-96.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, ch. 1, app. (Supp. 1988).
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marketable record title is subject to such interests and defects.8 4
19.6. FILING OF NOTICE
A marketable record title is subject to any interest preserved by
filing a notice of claim in accordance with the terms of Section 74 and
75 of the Marketable Record Title Act. 5
84. OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, ch. 1, app. (Supp. 1988). The Comments to Standard 19.5 state:
Authority: 16 O.S.A. § 72(a) & (d); L. Simes & C. Taylor, Model Title Standards,
Standard 4.6, at 28-29 (1960).
Similar Standard: Mich., 1.8.
Comment: This standard is explainable by the following illustrations:
1. In 1915, a deed was recorded conveying land from A, the owner in fee simple abso-
lute, to "B and his heirs so long as the land is used for residence purposes," thus creating a
determinable fee in B and reserving a possibility of reverter in A. In 1925, a deed was
recorded from B to C and his heirs "so long as the land is used for residence purposes, this
conveyance being subject to a possibility of reverter in A." In 1945, C has a marketable
record title, to a determinable fee, which is subject to A's possibility of reverter.
2. Suppose, however, that, in 1915, a deed was recorded conveying a certain tract of
land from A, the owner in fee simple absolute, to "B and his heirs so long as the land is
used for residence purposes"; and suppose, also, that in 1918 a deed was recorded by B to
C and his heirs, conveying the same tract in fee simple absolute, in which no mention was
made of any special limitation or of A's possibility of reverter. There being no other instru-
ments of record in 1948, C has a marketable record title in fee simple absolute. His root of
title is the deed from B to C and not the deed from A to B; and there are no interests in
third parties or defects created by the "muniments of which such chain of record title is
formed."
A general reference to interests prior to the root of title is not sufficient unless specific
identification is made to a recorded title transaction, 16 O.S.A. § 72(a).
History: Adopted December, 1964. Printed as a part of Proposal No. 12 of 1964 Real
Property Committee, 35 O.B.A.J. 2045, 2046 (1964) and see Exhibit H, id. at 2054-55.
Approved, upon recommendation of Real Property Section, by House of Delegates, 36
O.B.AJ. 179, 182 (1965). All references to prior 40-year period deleted, 30 years substi-
tuted, and dates in "Comments" corrected to agree with 30-year period as per direction of
House of Delegates, see Minutes of House for 1977, at 93-96.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, ch. 1, app. (Supp. 1988).
85. OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, ch. 1, app. (Supp. 1988). The Comments to Standard 19.6 state:
Authority: 16 O.S.A. §§ 74 & 75; L. Simes & C. Taylor, Model Title Standards, Stan-
dard 4.7, at 29-30 (1960).
Comment: Suppose A was the grantee in a chain of record title of a tract of land, a deed
to which was recorded in 1900. In 1902, a mortgage of the same land from A to X was
recorded. In 1906, a mortgage of the same land from A to Y was recorded. In 1918, a
deed of the same land from A to B in fee simple absolute was recorded, which made no
mention of the mortgages. In 1947, Y recorded a notice of his mortgage, as provided in
Sections 74 and 75 of the Act. X did not record any notice. In 1948, B had a marketable
record title, which is subject to Y's mortgage, but not to X's mortgage. B's root of title is
the 1918 deed. Therefore X and Y had until 1948 to record a notice for the purpose of
preserving their interests. If X had fied a notice after 1948, it would have been a nullity,
since his interest was already extinguished.
The filing of a notice may be a nullity not only because it comes too late, but also because
it concerns a subject matter not within the scope of the statute. Thus, recorded notices of
real estate commissions claimed or other charges which do not constitute liens on the prop-
erty have no effect under the Act, 16 O.S.A. § 72(b).
History: Adopted December, 1964. Printed as a part of Proposal No. 12 of 1964 Real
Property Committee, 35 O.B.A.J. 2045, 2046 (1964) and see Exhibit H, id. at 2055-56.
Approved, upon recommendation of Real Property Section, by House of Delegates, 36
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19.7. THIRTY-YEAR POSSESSION IN LIEU
OF FILING NOTICE
If an owner of a possessory interest in land under a recorded title
transaction (1) has been in possession of such land for a period of
thirty (30) years or more after the recording of such instrument, and
(2) such owner is still in possession of the land, any Marketable Record
Title, based upon an independent chain of title, is subject to the title of
such possessory owner, even though such possessory owner has failed
to record any notice of his claim.
19.8. EFFECT OF ADVERSE POSSESSION
A marketable record title is subject to any title by adverse posses-
sion which accrues at any time subsequent to the effective date of the
root of title, but not to any title by adverse possession which accrued
prior to the effective date of the root of title.87
O.B.A.J. 179, 182 (1965). All references to prior 40-year period deleted, 30 years substi-
tuted, and dates in "Comments" corrected to agree with 30-year period as per direction of
House of Delegates, see Minutes of House for 1977, at 93-96.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, ch. 1, app. (Supp. 1988).
86. OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, ch. 1, app. (Supp. 1988). The Comments to Standard 19.7 state:
Authority: 16 O.S.A. §§ 72(d) & 74(b); L. Simes & C. Taylor, Model Title Standards,
Standard 4.8, at 30-31 (1960).
Comment: The kind of situation which gives rise to this standard is suggested by the
following illustration. A was the last grantee in a chain of record title to a tract of land, by
a deed recorded in 1915. There were no subsequent instruments of record in this chain of
title. A has been in possession of the land since 1915 and continues in possession, but has
never filed any notice as provided in Section 74 of the Marketable Record Title Act. A
deed of the same land, unconnected with A's chain of title, from X to Y, was recorded in
1916; no other instruments with respect to this land appearing of title. On the other hand,
A had a marketable record title in 1945, but in 1946, according to Section 72(d), it is
subject to Y's marketable record title. Thus, the relative rights of A and of Y are deter-
mined independently of the Act, since the interest of each is subject to the other's deed.
A's interest being prior in time, and Y's deed being merely a "wild deed," under common
law principles A's title should prevail.
Under 16 O.S.A. § 74(b). possession cannot be "tacked" to eliminate the necessity of
recording a notice of claim.
History: Adopted December, 1964. Printed as a part of Proposai No. 12 of 1964 Real
Property Committee, 35 O.B.AJ. 2045, 2046 (1964) and see Exhibit H, hl at 2056. Ap-
proved, upon recommendation of Real Property Section, by House of Delegates, 36
O.B.A.J. 179, 182 (1965). As a result of a proposal by the 1970 Real Property Committee's
Supplemental Report, printed as Exhibit F, 41 O.B.A.J. 2676, 2678 (1970), approved by
the Real Property Section on Dec. 3, 1970 and adopted by the House of Delegates on
December 4, 1970, 42 O.B.A.J. 706 (1971), the last sentence of the standard in its previous
form calling attention to the amendment shortening the period to thirty years was added.
Pertinent statutory authority, relating to the amendment, has been added by the editor
pursuant to the directive in the Committee's Supplemental Report, Exhibit I, 41 O.B.A.J.
2676, 2679 (1970). Subsequently all references to prior 40-year period deleted, 30 years
substituted, and dates in "Comments" corrected to agree with 30-year period as per direc-
tion of House of Delegates, see Minutes of House for 1977, at 93-96.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, ch. 1, app. (Supp. 1988).
87. OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, ch. 1, app. (Supp. 1988). The Comments to Standard 19.8 state:
Authority: 16 O.S.A. §§ 72(c) & 73; L. Simes & C. Taylor, Model Title Standards, Stan-
dard 4.9, at 31 (1960).
Comment: (Assume the period for title by adverse possession is 15 years.)
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19.9. EFFECT OF RECORDING TITLE TRANSACTION
DURING THIRTY-YEAR PERIOD
The recording of a title transaction subsequent to the effective
date of the root of title has the same effect in preserving any interest
conveyed as the filing of the notice provided for in Section 74 of the
Act. 8
8
1. A is the grantee of a tract of land in a deed which was recorded in 1900. In the same
year, X entered into possession, claiming adversely to all the world, and continued such
adverse possession until 1916. In 1917, a deed conveying the same land from A to B was
recorded. No other instruments concerning the land appearing of record, B has a market-
able record title in 1947, which extinguished X's title by adverse possession acquired in
1915.
2. Suppose A is the grantee of a tract of land in a deed which was recorded in 1915. In
1941, X entered into possession, claiming adversely to all the world, and continued such
adverse possession until the present time. No other instruments concerning the land ap-
pearing of record in 1945, A had a marketable record title, but it was subject to X's ad-
verse possession and when his period for title by adverse possession was completed in 1956,
A's title was subject to X's title by adverse possession.
History: Adopted December, 1964. Printed as a part of Proposal No. 12 of 1964 Real
Property Committee, 35 O.B.A.J. 2045, 2046 (1964) and see Exhibit H, id. at 2056-57.
Approved, upon recommendation of Real Property Section, by House of Delegates, 36
O.B.A.J. 179, 182 (1965). All references to prior 40-year period deleted, 30 years substi-
tuted, and dates in "Comments" corrected to agree with 30-year period as per direction of
House of Delegates, see Minutes of House for 1977, at 93-96.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, ch. 1, app. (Supp. 1988).
88. OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, ch. 1, app. (Supp. 1988). The Comments to Standard 19.9 state:
Authority: 16 O.S.A. §§ 72(d); L. Simes & C. Taylor, Model Title Standards, Standard
4.10, at 32-33 (1960).
Comment: This standard is operative both where there are claims under a single chain
oftitle and where there are two or more independent chains of title. The following illustra-
tions show how it operates.
1. Suppose A is the grantee of a tract of land in a deed which was recorded in 1900. A
mortgage of this land executed by A to X was recorded in 1905. In 1910, a deed conveying
the land from A to B was recorded, this deed making no reference to the mortgage to X.
In 1939, an instrument assigning X's mortgage to Y was recorded. In 1940, B had a mar-
ketable record title. But it was subject to the mortgage held by Y because the assignment
of the mortgage was recorded less than thirty years after the effective date of B's root of
title. If, however, Y had recorded the assignment in 1941 the mortgage would already
have been extinguished in 1940 by B's marketable title; and recording the assignment in
1941 would not revive it.
2. Suppose a tract of land was conveyed to A, B and C as tenants in common, the deed
being recorded in 1900. Then in 1905, A and B conveyed the entire tract in fee simple to D
and the deed was at once recorded. In 1925, D conveyed to E in fee simple, and the deed
was at once recorded. No mention of C's interest was made in either the 1905 or 1925
deeds. Nothing further appearing of record, E had a marketable record title to the entire
tract in 1935. This extinguished C's undivided one-third interest.
3. Suppose the same facts, but assume also that in 1936, C conveyed his one-third
interest to X in fee simple, the deed being at once recorded. This does not help him any.
His interest, being extinguished in 1935, is not revived by this conveyance.
4. Suppose A, being the grantee in a regular chain of record title, conveyed to B in fee
simple in 1900, the deed being at once recorded. Then, in 1905, X, a stranger to the title,
conveyed to Y in fee simple, and the deed was at once recorded. In 1925, Y conveyed to Z
in fee simple and the deed was at once recorded. Then suppose in 1927, B conveyed to C in
fee simple, the deed being at once recorded. In 1935, Z and C each have marketable record
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19.10. QUITCLAIM DEED OR TESTAMENTARY
RESIDUARY CLAUSE IN THIRTY-YEAR CHAIN
A recorded quitclaim deed or residuary clause in probated will
can be a root of title or a link in a chain of title, for purposes of a
thirty-year record title under the Marketable Record Title Act.89
titles, but each is subject to the other. Hence neither extinguishes the other, and the rela-
tive rights of the parties are determined independently of the Act. C's title, therefore,
should prevail.
5. Suppose, however, that the facts were the same except that B conveyed to C in 1937
instead of 1927. In that case, Z's marketable record title extinguished B's title in 1935,
thirty years after the effective date of his root of title, and it is not revived by the convey-
ance in 1937.
History: Adopted December, 1964. Printed as a part of Proposal No. 12 of 1964 Real
Property Committee, 35 O.B.A.J. 2045, 2046 (1964) and see Exhibit H, id. at 2057-58.
Approved, upon recommendation of Real Property Section, by House of Delegates, 36
O.B.A.J. 179, 182 (1965). All references to prior 40-year period deleted, 30 years substi-
tuted, and dates in "Comments" corrected to agree with 30-year period as per direction of
House of Delegates, see Minutes of House for 1977, at 93-96.
OKLa. STAT. tit. 16, ch. 1, app. (Supp. 1988).
89. OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, ch. 1, app. (Supp. 1988). The Comments to Standard 19.10 state:
Authority: 16 O.S.A. §§ 71 & 78(e) & (f); L. Simes & C. Taylor, Model Title Stan-
dards, Standard 4.11, at 33-34 (1960).
Related Standards: Mich., 1.3; Neb., 52.
Comment: The Marketable Record Title Act defines "root of title" as a title transaction
"purporting to create the interest claimed." See section 78(e). "Title transaction" is de-
fined to include a variety of transactions, among which are title by quitclaim deed, by will
and by descent. See Section 78(f).
A quitclaim deed can be a root of title to the interest it purports to create. Suppose there
is a break in the chain of title, and the first instrument after the break is a quitclaim deed.
Assume that the first recorded instrument in the chain of title is a patent from the United
States to A, recorded in 1890, and that the next is a warranty deed from A to B in fee
simple, recorded in 1910. Then, in 1915, there is a quitclaim deed from C to D purporting
to convey "the above described land" to D in fee simple. Further assume that there are no
other recorded title transactions or notices after this deed, and that D is in possession,
claiming to be the owner in fee simple. Under the Marketable Record Title Act, the 1915
deed is the root of title and purports to create a fee simple in D. Therefore, in 1945, D has
a good title in fee simple.
Clearly the quitclaim deed can be a link in a chain of record title under the provisions of
the Act. See sections 71 and 78(f). If it can be an effective link, it must necessarily follow
that it can be an effective "root" to the interest it purports to create.
History: Adopted December, 1964. Printed as a part of Proposal No. 12 of 1964 Real
Property Committee, 35 O.B.A.J. 2045, 2046 and see Exhibit H, id. at 2058. Approved,
upon recommendation of Real Property Section, by House of Delegates, 36 O.B.A.J. 179,
182. As a result of a proposal by the 1970 Real Property Committee's Supplemental Re-
port, printed as Exhibit G, 41 O.B.A.J. 2676, 2678 (1970), approved by the Real Property
Section on Dec. 3, 1970 and adopted by the House of Delegates on December 4, 1970, 42
O.B.A.J. 706 (1971), the last sentence of the standard in its previous form calling attention
to the amendment shortening the period to thirty years was added. Pertinent statutory
authority, relating to the amendment, has been added by the editor pursuant to the direc-
tive in the Committee's Supplemental Report, Exhibit I, 41 O.B.A.J. 2676, 2679 (1970).
All references to prior 40-year period deleted, 30 years substituted, and dates in "Com-
ments" corrected to agree with 30-year period as per direction of House of Delegates, see
Minutes of House for 1977, at 93-96.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, ch. 1, app. (Supp. 1988).
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19.11. THIRTY-YEAR ABSTRACT
The Marketable Record Title Act has not eliminated the necessity
of furnishing an abstract of title for a period in excess of thirty (30)
years.
90
19.12. EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE ACT
The Marketable Record Title Act became effective September 13,
1963. The two year period for filing notices of claim under Section 74
expired September 13, 1965. The Act was amended March 27, 1970,
by reducing the forty (40) year period to thirty (30) years, effective
July 1, 1972. If the thirty (30) year period expired prior to March 27,
1970, such period was extended to July 1, 1972 and notices of claim
could be filed to and including that date.
9 1
90. OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, ch. 1, app. (Supp. 1988). The Comments to Standard 19.11 state:
Authority: 16 O.S.A. § 76; L. Simes & C. Taylor, Model Title Standards, Standard
4.12, at 35 (1960).
Similar Standard: Nebr., 44.
Comment: Section 76 of the act names several interests which are not barred by the
Act, to-wit: the interest of a lessor as a reversioner; mineral or royalty interests; easements
created by a written instrument; subdivision agreements; interests of the U.S., etc. These
record interests may not be determined by an examination of the abstract for a period of no
more than thirty (30) years.
Furthermore, in all cases, the abstract must go back to the conveyance or other title
transaction which is the "root of title"; and it will rarely occur that this instrument was
recorded precisely thirty years prior to the present time. In nearly every case the period,
from the recording of the "root of title" to the present, will be somewhat more than thirty
years.
History: Adopted December, 1964. Printed as a part of Proposal No. 12 of 1964 Real
Property Committee, 35 O.B.AJ. 2045, 2046 (1964) and see Exhibit H, id. at 2058-59.
Approved, upon recommendation of Real Property Section, by House of Delegates, 36
O.B.A.J. 179, 182 (1965). As a result of a proposal by the 1970 Real Property Committee's
Supplemental Report, printed as Exhibit H, 41 O.B.A.J. 2676, 2678 (1970), approved by
the Real Property Section on Dec. 3, 1970 and adopted by the House of Delegates on
December 4, 1970, 42 O.B.A.J. 706, the last sentence of the standard making it clear that
the amendment to the Marketable Record Title Act will not eliminate the necessity of
furnishing an abstract of title in excess of thirty years after July 1, 1972 was added. Perti-
nent statutory authority, relating to the amendment, has been added by the editor pursuant
to the directive in the Committee's Supplemental Report, Exhibit I, 41 O.B.A.J. 2676, 2679
(1970). All references to prior 40-year period deleted, 30 years substituted, and dates in
"Comments" corrected to agree with 30-year period as per direction of House of Delegates,
see Minutes of House for 1977, at 93-96.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, ch. 1, app. (Supp. 1988).
91. OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, ch. 1, app. (Supp. 1988). The Comments to Standard 19.12 state:
Authority: As to the original "forty years" statute, 1963 Okla. Sess. Laws, ch. 31, §§ 4,
5 & 11. As to the present "thirty years" statute, 16 O.S.A. §§ 74 & 75 and 1970 Okla. Sess.
Laws, ch. 92, § 7.
Comment: Remainders, long term mortgages and other non-possessory interests prior
to the root of title should be reviewed to see if a notice of claim is required. Also, if the
owner is out of possession and he has recorded no instruments or other title transactions
during the preceding thirty (30) years, consideration should be given to filing a notice of
claim.
Prior non-possessory interests may be preserved by reference in an instrument or other
title transaction recorded subsequent to the root of title. But the reference must specifically
identify a recorded transaction. A general reference is not sufficient. 16 O.S.A. § 72(a).
History: Adopted December, 1964. Printed as a part of Proposal No. 12 of 1964 Real
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52




Abstracting under the Marketable Record Title Act shall be suffi-
cient when the following is shown in the abstract:
A. The patent, grant or other conveyance from the government.
B. The following title transactions occuring prior to the first
conveyance or other title transaction in "C." below: easements or in-
terests in the nature of an easement; unreleased leases with indefinite
terms such as oil and gas leases; unreleased leases with terms which
have not expired; instruments or proceedings pertaining to bankrupt-
cies; use restrictions or area agreements whch are part of a plan for
subdivision development; any right, title or interest of the United
States.
C. The conveyance or other title transaction constituting the
root of title to the interest claimed, together with all conveyances and
other title tranactions of any character subsequent to said conveyance
or other title transaction; or if there be a mineral severance prior to
said conveyance or other title transaction, then the first conveyance or
other title transaction prior to said mineral severance, together with all
conveyances and other title transactions of any character subsequent to
said conveyance or other title transaction.
D. Conveyances, title transactions and other instruments re-
corded prior to the conveyance or other title transaction in "C." which
are specifically identified in said conveyance or other title transaction
or any subsequent instrument shown in the abstract.
E. Any deed imposing restrictions upon alienation without prior
consent of the Secretary of the Interior or a federal agency, for exam-
ple, a Carny Lacher deed.
F. Where title stems from a tribe of Indians or from a patent
where the United States holds title in trust for an Indian the abstract
shall contain all recorded instruments from inception of title other
than treaties except (1) where there is an Unallotted Land Deed or
where a patent is to a Freedman or Inter-Married White member of
the Five Civilized Tribes, in which event only the patent and the mate-
rial under "B.", "C.", "D." and "E." need be shown; and (2) where a
Property Committee, 35 O.B.AJ. 2045, 2046 (1964) and see Exhibit H, id. at 2059. Ap-
proved, upon recommendation of Real Property Section, by House of Delegates, 36
O.B.AJ. 179, 182 (1965). As a result of a proposal by the 1970 Real Property Committee's
Supplemental Report, printed as Exhibit I, 41 O.B.A.J. 2676, 2679 (1970). Approved by
the Real Property Section on Dec. 3, 1970 and adopted by the House of Delegates on
December 4, 1970, 42 O.B.A.J. 706 (1971), this standard was modified to reflect the
amendment shortening the period to thirty years. Pertinent statutory authority, relating to
the amendment, has been added by the editor pursuant to the directive in the Committee's
Supplemental Report, Exhibit I, 41 O.B.AJ. 2676, 2679 (1970). Tense of verbs in last
clause of third sentence changed by Editor, 1978; "Authority" amended to indicate where
prior and current statutes may be found by Editor, 1978, see Minutes of House of Dele-
gates for 1977, at 93-96.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, ch. 1, app. (Supp. 1988).
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patent is from the Osage Nation to an individual and there is of record
a conveyance from the allottee and a Certificate of Competency, only
the patent, the conveyance from the allottee, the Certificate of Compe-
tency, certificate as to degree of blood of the allottee and the material
under "B.", "C.", "D.", and "E." need be shown.
The abstractor shall state on the caption page and in the certifi-
cate of an abstract compiled under this standard:
"This abstract is compiled in accordance with Oklahoma Title
Standard No. 19.13 under 16 O.S.A. §§ 71-80.",92
1. Background
The Act underlying these Standards is an extinguishment statute
that destroys most claims or defects of title before the root of title.93 The
root of title is an instrument "purporting to divest" that is in a chain of
title and that has been of record for at least thirty years.
A title examiner must look for and review the following instruments
prior to a root of title: (a) patent, grant, or other conveyance from the
government; (b) easements or interests in the nature of an easement;
92. OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, ch. 1, app. (Supp. 1988). The Comments to Standard 19.13 state:
Authority: 16 O.S.A. §§ 71-80, 46 O.S.A. § 203, and Oklahoma Title Examination Stan-
dard 13.7.
Comments: 1. The purpose of this standard is to simplify title examination and reduce
the size of abstracts.
2. Deeds, mortgages, affidavits, caveats, notices, estoppel agreements, powers of attor-
ney, tax liens, mechanic liens, judgments and foreign executions recorded prior to the first
conveyance or other title transaction in "C." and not referred to therein or subsequent
thereto and also probate, divorce, foreclosure, partition and quiet title actions concluded
prior to the first conveyance or other title transaction in "C." are to be omitted from the
abstract.
3. Interests and defects prior to the first conveyance or other title transaction in "C."
are not to be shown unless specifically identified. The book and page of the recording of a
prior mortgage is required to be in any subsequent deed or mortgage to give notice of such
prior mortgage, 46 O.S.A. § 203 and Title Standard 13.7. Specific identification of other
instruments requires either the book and page of recording or the date and place of record-
ing or such other information as will enable the abstractor to locate the instrument of
record.
4. Abstracting under this standard should also be in conformity with Title Standard
18.6.
History: Adopted December 5, 1969. Resolution No. 1, 1969 Real Property Commit-
tee 40 O.B.A.J. 2405 (1969) and Exhibit A, id. at 2406-2407. Approved by Real Property
Section and adopted by House of Delegates, 41 O.B.AJ. 287 (1970). Citation of act
amended by Editor, 1978, to agree with repeal of § 81, 1970 Okla. Sess. Laws, Ch. 92, § 5,
reference to prior 40-year period deleted and 30 years substituted, see Minutes of House of
Delegates for 1977, pages 93-96.
Amended December 3, 1982. Amendment proposed by Report of 1982 Title Examina-
tion Standards Committee, 53 O.B.A.J. 2731, 2734-35 (1982). Proposal amended by Real
Property Section, December 2, 1982, and approved as amended. Adopted as amended by
House of Delegates.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, ch. 1, app. (Supp. 1988).
93. Mobbs v. City of Lehigh, 655 P.2d 547 (Okla. 1982).
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(c) unreleased leases with indefinite terms, such as oil and gas leases;
(d) unreleased leases with terms that have not expired; (e) instruments or
proceedings pertaining to bankruptcies; (f) use restrictions or area agree-
ments which are part of a plan for subdivision development; (g) any
right, title, or interest of the United States; (h) severed mineral and roy-
alty interests; (i) instruments expressly identified in other instruments
falling within a chain of title back to and including the root of title; and
() instruments relating to Indian titles.
In Anderson v. Pickering, the Oklahoma Court of Appeals stated
that there is no authority for requiring a vendee to purchase real property
when title is defective. The court further explained that although the
Merchantable Title Act, really the Marketable Record Title Act, pro-
vides a statutory method for quieting title, it is not self-executing nor a
perfect remedy applicable in every case.94 However, as one article has
noted, it appears that the Anderson decision is premised on the fact that
the sellers were trying to force the buyers to accept title based on adverse
possession and not on marketable title created under the Act.
95
A later decision of the Oklahoma Supreme Court, Mobbs v. City of
Lehigh, expressly assumed the Act was constitutional, but the court also
stated that "[w]e intimate no view on the constitutionality of the Act
because its validity was not framed as an issue in the trial court."
96
Mobbs held that under the operation of the Act, a void tax deed could be
a valid root of title because its defective nature was not "inherent" but
rather was a "transmission" problem.97
As mentioned above, the constitutionality of this Act has not been
directly challenged. There is general Oklahoma case law to the effect
that every statute is presumed to be valid, constitutional, and binding on
all parties as of the effective date of each statute, and that such a pre-
sumption continues until there is a determination to the contrary.98
It was hoped that the applicability of this Act to Indian land would
be upheld if it were determined to be a statute of limitations and not an
extinguishment statute. However, the Mobbs decision99 ended this
possibility.
94. Anderson v. Pickering, 541 P.2d 1361, 1364 (Okla. Ct. App. 1975).
95. Blair & Rheinberger, Anderson v. Pickering and the Marketable Record Title Act, 51 OKLA.
B.J. 2517, 2518 (1980).
96. Mobbs, 655 P.2d at 547.
97. Id. at 549.
98. See standard 2.3, OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, ch. 1, app. (Supp. 1988).
99. Mobbs, 655 P.2d at 550-51.
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As an oil and gas title examiner, one must be especially cautious to
look behind the root of title first to determine title ownership to any min-
eral or royalty interest which has been severed, and second to identify
unreleased leases with indefinite or unexpired terms. Therefore, the Act
is only helpful to the extent that a surface and mineral estate remain
together and unsevered.
Standard 19.13 allows and encourages abstracters to prepare thirty-
year root of title abstracts conforming to the Act. A proposal to repeal
Standard 19.13 was presented by the Standards Committee to the Real
Property Section in 1986 at the Section's annual meeting, but the repeal
proposal was defeated. Repeal of this Standard would not have affected
the statute, but would have discouraged abstracters and examiners from
making and relying on such "short" abstracts.
2. Practicalities
The following discussion does not address all the examples accom-
panying Standard 19, but includes some general comments concerning
the applicability of the Act as well as some situations where the Act and
the Standards are useful.
The examiner should not examine the title backwards from the most
recent instrument to attempt to find a root of title recorded for more than
thirty years. Every abstract or county record should be examined from
inception forward. Only after full consideration of all the instruments
should the examiner apply the Act to a certain sequence. Most examin-
ers have never seen an abstract prepared pursuant to Standard 19.13 and
might feel uncomfortable if such an abstract were presented to them for
examination. The examiner should not question the constitutionality of
the Act even though the issue of constitutionality has not been deter-
mined by the Oklahoma Supreme Court. An examiner should not rely
on the Act without advising the client that such reliance has been made
and further advising that there is some case authority that the statute is
not self-executing, but must be accompanied by a quiet title action. The
Act cannot be used in dealing with severed minerals. The Act should not
be relied upon without mentioning it is subject to the rights of persons in
possession of the property.
The following are five situations in which the Act and Standards are
very useful. The first situation is when a record owner has an interest
which is the subject of a mortgage foreclosure followed by a sheriff's
deed which has been recorded more than thirty years. This situation is
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also reinforced by reliance on the Simplification of Land Titles Act previ-
ously discussed. Second, the Act comes into play when a patent from the
Commissioners of the Land Office is issued after the extinguishment of a
prior certificate of purchase. It is not unusual to see a certificate of
purchase issued to one party, followed by another certificate of purchase
issued to another party together with a Commissioners of the Land Office
patent that has been recorded more than thirty years. The Act can then
be relied upon, and no further inquiry into the proper extinguishment of
the certificate of purchase is necessary.
Third, in regard to tax deeds, the case of Mobbs v. City of Lehigh,' °
is authority for the proposition that a tax deed can be relied upon as a
valid root of title without inquiring into the validity of the proceedings
leading to the tax deed. Fourth, an examiner can rely upon deeds re-
corded more than thirty years in which the grantors purport to be the
sole heirs of the record owner. And fifth, relying on dicta in the Mobbs
case, an examiner should be fairly comfortable with a "stray" or "wild"
deed which has been of record more than thirty years."10
IV. CONCLUSION
This article is by its nature only an analysis of the current status of
title examination practice in the state of Oklahoma. The continuing en-
actment of new statutes, deciding of new cases, and drafting of new title
standards dictates that this area of the law changes almost on a daily
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